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In a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert s. 
McNamara dated October 15, 1965, Dr . Robert N. Anthony, 
Assistant Secre tary of Defense (Comptroller ) , outlined the 
concepts upon which a new management control system within 
the Department of Defense (DOD ) would be built . l Preceding 
that memorandum is a long history of continuous change to 
defense and other Federal Government budgeting and accounting 
procedure s . Out of that memorandum has grown an interlocking 
series of sweeping changes which transcend budgeting and 
accounting procedures and go to the foundations of military 
line operating management itself . 
Those changes are collectively entitled the 11Resource 
Management Systems :' (RMS ) . That portion of RMS which is con-
cerned with changes to programming, budgeting, and accounting 
systems and specifically to management of resources for oper-
ations is entitled the :'Priority Management Effort " ( PRIME ) 
and is the subject of this study . RMS is the broader, more 
inclusive of the two terms. For the purpose of this study, 
lMemorandum from Hon. Robert N. Anthony, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller ) , to Hon . Robe rt S. McNamara, 
Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. c., October 15, 1965. 
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any reference to RMS is equally applicable to PRIME. The 
converse is true and the two terms are to be considered 
interchangeable . 
An impressive volume of information concerning PRIME 
has been disseminated by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD ) , a term which this study uses to include all 
subordinate offices within the Secretary of Defense organiza-
tion, to the military departments, the Federal Government as 
a whole, and the general public . The tenor of that informa-
tion is that existing military resource management techniques 
are generally inadequate and unsatisfactory and that a totally 
new management control system is therefore required to replace 
the existing systems . As presented, the objectives and prom-
ised achievements of PRIME are alleged not only to eliminate 
the inadequacies of the systems being replaced but also to 
offer significant overall improvements to the management of 
military resources . 
There are, however, strong undercurrents of dissatis-
faction with PRIME in the military departments which can be 
sensed, if not verified directly . There are numerous dis-
agreements with certain specific provisions of PRIME which 
can be verified in official correspondence . The Congress 
refused to appropriate the funds required to implement PRIME 
in fiscal year 1969 which were requested by OSD, calling 
3 
PRIME 11 too much too soon. "2 The Congress further explicitly 
prohibited implementation of all or any part of PRIME in 
fiscal year 1968, with or without funds, and placed stringent 
constraints on any future implementation of PRIME . 
Psychological research indicates that it is natural 
for an individual, and organizations, to initially resist 
change, as such, regardless of the merits or demerits of the 
change . The resistance to PRIME as evidenced by the persist-
ent dissatisfaction in the military departments and the par-
ticularly strong reaction of the Congress suggests that 
something more than natural reluctance to give up the old way 
of doing things is involved . It is the purpose of this study 
to examine PRIME to determine if PRIME is indeed designed so 
as to be capable of delivering the improvements promised by 
its proponents and the reason or reasons why PRIME has aroused 
such strong resistance . 
The basic question that this study seeks to answer is: 
Can PRIME achieve the improvements to military resource manage-
ment which are claimed by its planners? Subsidiary questions 
are: Was PRIME planned on a purely theoretical level or did 
its planners give adequate consideration to practical matters 
as well? Are the resource management systems proposed by 
PRIME compatible with existing operating management systems? 
Is the management philosophy contem~lated by PRIME consistent 
2u.s. , Congress, House of Representatives, Committee 
on Appropriations, Department of Defense Alpropriation Bill, 
1968~ 90th Cong., 1st Sess . , H. Rept . 349 o accompany H.R. 
107'jtj, p . 6. 
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with existing military management philosophies? Are the 
changes to the military decision-making processes proposed by 
PRIME necessary and functional'? Will the benefits which 
accrue from PRIME justify its cost? 
This study will be limited to a viewpoint from within 
the Department of the Navy, excluding the u. s. Marine Corps . 
The reader must understand that the opinions expressed and 
conclusions drawn in this study are those of the writer in 
his role as a student and must not be considered as neces-
sarily representative of or supported by any military or 
civilian member of the Department of Defense . 
Information used for this study consists primarily of 
a great number of staff studies, reports, directives, memo-
randa, and other documents which originate in OSD and the 
Department of the Navy . The writer has experienced some 
difficulty in gathering relevant, current information per-
taining to PRIME . This difficulty was not caused by lack of 
assistance from within the DOD, which instead was freely 
given, but rather was for the following three reasons: 
1 . Guidelines for the implementation of PRIME have 
not been systematically promulgated by OSD but instead con-
sist of directives of a variety of forms, which include 
official, formal directives ("instructions 11 ) , formal memo-
randa, draft instructions and memor.3.nda, and implied guidance 
contained in speeches, articles in periodicals, and 




2. Despite information which might lead one to 
believe that PRIME is a complete set of systems and procedures 
which are ready to be implemented at the will of the Congress, 
several elements of PRIME exist largely in concept only at 
this time . 
3. PRIME has undergone considerable change since it 
was conceived and is expected to be changed even more, 
especially because of the Congressional prohibition of its 
implementation • 
Additional sources of information upon which this 
study relies are published materials relating to management, 
management control systems theory, and management within the 
Federal Government and DOD . Public Congressional documents 
provide insight into the reaction of the Congress to PRIME . 
A final source from which the writer will draw information 
is his nine-and-one-half-year experience in naval aviation 
material and financial support functions . 
To evaluate PRIME in terms of the question raised 
above, this study will examine the concepts ~ objectives, 
assumptions, and guidelines for implementation of PRIME as 
promulgated by OSD in the practical situations in which PRIME 
seeks to function . In addition to the management environment 
internal to DOD, the very important relationship between 
PRIME and the Congress will be discussed . The writer believes 
tha t this study is needed to provide a critical, if not more 
objective, evaluation of PRIME than is now available else-
where . 
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To lay the foundation for PRIME so that it may be 
viewed in the prope~ perspective, Chapter II will discuss 
the origins and current status of PRIME. Chapter III will 
expla in the objectives and concepts of PRIME to point out 
their significance and the assumptions upon which they a re 
based. Chapters IV and V will describe the actual working 
guidelines promulgated for the implementation of PRIME and 
the achievements and problems encountered. The final chapter, 
Chapter VI, will conclude this study with a brief evaluation 
of PRIME in terms of the questions raised by the writer and 
a general prognosis of the future of PRIME. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRIME 
To place PRIME in focus, it is necessary to trace the 
events and forces which precede it and shape its form and 
substance . PRIME is the union and extension of several 
parallel chains of evolution in the budgeting, accounting, 
and management processes of the Federal Government and the 
Defense establishment . The principal precedents of PRIME 
are budgeting reform and the movement toward program-based 
budgeting, the growth of civilian control of the Defense 
establishment, and the efforts to improve governmental 
accounting practices . 
Program Budgeting 
As a result of pressures which had their origins in 
the movements toward reform of municipal governments, 
President Taft requested in 1909 and the Congress authorized 
in 1910 a "Commission on Economy and Efficiency 11 to study the 
workings of the Federal Government . The report of the Com-
mission, presented to the Congress in 1912, recommended a 
comprehensive federal budget classified by program, or 
function, that would distinguish between expenditures for 
7 
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capital and for current items . l The Budget and Accounting 
Act of 1921 established the recommended comprehensive 
federal budget, but the budget form itself was largely un-
changed and focused upon object, or end-use of expenditure, 
not program or function . 
Program-based budgeting in the Federal Government as 
proposed by the Commission remained dormant except for 
limited application in a few non-defense agencies . The 
(Hoover ) Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch 
of the Government reopened interest in progrum-based budgets 
and recommended that the budget be " • • • based upon 
function, activitie~, and projects • ," the so-called 
"performancJ" budget . 2 · Although subsequently required for 
the Department of Defense by the 1949 amendments to the 
National Security Act of 1947, and encouraged for all of the 
Federal Government by the Budget and Accounting Procedures 
Act of 1950 (P . L. 784, 8lst Cong . , 2nd Sess .) , program 
budgeting remained largely a concept only . The DOD budget 
developed from the laws cited was still basically oriented 
toward object of expenditure, as evidenced by the supporting 
appropriation structure, which is as follows: 
1Arthur Smithies, "Conceptual Framework," Pro~ram 
Budgetin Pro ram Anal sis and the Federal Bud et, e • David 
Novick Cambr~dge, Massachuse s: Harvar Un versity Press, 
1965 ) , p . 30 . 
2commission on Organization of the Executive Branch 
of the Government, The Hoover Commission Re;ort (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949 ) , p. 3 • 
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Operations and Maintenance 
Military Personnel 
Procurement 
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
Military Construction 
Only the fourth category, Research, Development, 
Test, and Evaluation, indicates the program or function 
served by the appropriation . Since the budget is structured 
upon organizations and the other categories of appropriations 
do not, in themselves, denote programs, the DOD budget indi-
cated only the "what for," not the "why" of DOD spending . 
As stated by Robert Grosse and Arnold Proschan: 
The establishment of appropriations of this kind was 
generally regarded as fulfilling the recommendations of 
the first Hoover Commission . • • • It would later be 
questioned whether these appropriations adequately re-
vealed the purposes of Defense activity . The growing 
need for a more informative classification would be a 
principal motivation of the programming system. 
(Emphasis mine .) 3 
After the hearings on the fiscal year 1960 DOD appro-
priations, the Chairman of the House Committee on Appropria-
tions, Mr. George H. Mahon, called for analysis of the 1961 
DOD budget on a functional, or program basis . 4 Out of that 
request and the subsequent successful application of program 
budgeting in the DOD has grown the Planning-Programming-
Budgeting (PPB ) system of the Federal Government. PPB 
requires that "the program categories used in each agency 
3Robert N. Grosse and Arnold Proschan, "The Annual 
Cycle: Planning-Programming-Budgeting," Defense Management, 
ed . Stephen Enke {Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1967}, pp. 26-27 . 
4Ibid . , p . 30 . 
; 
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should provide a suit able frarr.ework f or cons ideri ng and 
resolving the ma jor quest i ons of mi s s i on and s cale of 
I 
operations • ••• "5 with respect to "long-range goals and 
ob j ectives and antic i pate d progr am acc omplis hments . 116 
Budgetary r eview in the Executive Branch of t he Federal 
Gove rnment will hencef orth be in program terms . PPB wi ll 
extend to all Exec ut ive Branch agenc ies and departments$ with 
only minor except i ons , on J anuary 1, 1968 . 
Civilian Control of the Defense Establishment 
The second major precedent of PRIME originated with 
the National Security Act of 1947 which created the National 
Military Establishment under the nominal leadership of the 
Secretary of Defense. In addition to calling for program-
based budgets, as previously discussed, the 1949 amendments 
to the Act created the Department of Defense and strengthened 
the authority of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
added the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense 
{Comptroller ) and a comptroller to each of the military 
departments, and downgraded the military departments from 
executive status . The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 
{P. L. 599, 85th Cong. , 2d Sess. ) further added to the 
authority of the Secretary of Defense . Budgeting remained, 
5u.s. , Executive Office of the President, Bureau of 
the Budget, Bulletin No . 68-2, 11 Planning-Programming-
Budge t i ng , 11 Washington, D. c. , Jul y 18 , 1967, p . 2. 
6Ibid . , p . 3 . 
; 
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however, largely a process carried out directly between the 
military departments and the Congress . As described by 
William A. Niskanen, "During the late 1950 ' s there was a 
growing recognition that the civilian administration of the 
Department of Defense had been losing control of the central 
political element of the defense program--the allocation of 
resources among missions . "? 
At this crucial point in time, Congressman Mahon's 
call for analysis of the budget in program terms coincided 
with the appointment of Mr . Robert s . McNamara to the posi-
tion of Secretary of Defense and Mr . Charles J . Hitch, an 
advocate of program budgeting, to Assistant Secretary of 
Defense {Comptroller ). Those appointments led to quick 
installation of program budgeting within the DOD under the 
firm control of the Secretary of Defense and signalled the 
beginning of a new era of strong civilian control over the 
military departments and of a new willingness to change the 
traditional military management practices . 
Accounting Improvement 
The effectiveness of a budget as a planning and 
control device depends to a large part upon the adequacy of 
the financial information upon which the budget is based . In 
recognition of the inability of existing Federal Government 
accounting systems to uniformly and consistently generate 
?william A. Niskanen, "The Defense Resource Allocation 
Process, 11 Defense Management, ed . Stephen Enke (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Je:r. sey: Prentice-Hall, Inc . , 1967) , p . 7 . 
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reliable and useable information, the Comptroller General of 
the United States began formal cooperation in 1947 with the 
Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Secretary of the 
Treasury to work toward governmental accounting reform. The 
objectives of this program, known initially as the "Joint 
Program for Improving .Accounting in the Federal Government, " 
were declared to be the policy of the Congress and the program 
was restyled to be the "Joint Financial Management Improvement 
Program" by the Budget and .Accounting Procedures .Act of 1950 . 
That Act calls for, among other things, accrual accounting. 
Public Law 84-863 (31 . U. S. C. 24 ) , passed in 1956 following 
the recommendations of the Second Hoover Commission, reiter-
ates the requirement for accrual accounting and adds the 
requirement for cost-based budgeting for both the internal 
executive branch operations and the appropriation requests 
submitted to the Congress • 
.As of 1965, many years after the passage of the 
legislation discussed above, accounting systems in the DOD 
remained essentially unchanged . Accounting procedures within 
the military departments emphasized the accounting for obli-
gations and expenditures within the appropriation structure 
enacted by the Congress and budgeting emphasized obligations 
to be incurred during the budget period, not necessarily 
actual resources consttmed . The accrual concept of accounting 
was applied only to certain commercial-type Defense activities 
and to civilian personnel payrolls . Furthermore, accounting 
systems were structured on the existing military organizations 
; 
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which were not consistent with the program structure used for 
PPB . Consequently, a complicated and sometimes arbitrary 
proration process was required to convert financial informa-
tion generated by organizational accounting to information 
required for the DOD program structure . In addition, the 
distinction between capital and current items in the military 
appropriations was not clear . Thus, military accounting 
systems were not in accord with the wishes of the Congress 
expressed in law . The Congress, however, had not exerted 
pressure on the military departments, nor on any Executive 
Branch department or agency to comply with the laws . The 
Honorable Frank H. Weitzel, Assistant Comptroller General of 
the United States, stated that the reason for the failure to 
comply with the laws was a combination of the fact that 
,, the Executive Branch was not fully sold on cost-based . . . 
budgets and the accrual basis of accounting 11 d th •• , an e 
fact that the Executive Branch was " • • • still able to get 
appropriations • • • , 11 without compliance 8 
The Emergence of PRIME 
The appointment of Dr . Robert N. Anthony to the 
position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller ) in 
1965 marked the final intersection of the various trains of 
events discussed above . At the request of Secretary McNamara, 
8Frank H. Weitzel, Assistant Comptroller General of 
the United States, in an Address to the Students of the Navy 
Graduate Financial Management Program, The George Washington 




Dr . Anthony set out to pull together all the various pieces 
of management, accounting, and budgeting systems into one 
integrated management control system for the whole of the 
DOD . Within the framework of the laws previously cited, and 
using to its fullest the authority held by the civilian 
managers of the DOD, Dr . Anthony developed RMS and PRIME not 
only to satisfy the laws and enhance the effectiveness of PPB 
but also to establish a completely new management environment 
and philosophy in the DOD . PRIME was given added impetus by 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, who stated in a memorandum dated 
May 24, 1966, that "I have a strong and continuing interest 
in the development of business-like financial systems • • • • 
With a positive action program on your part, we can readily 
achieve what is contemplated in the Budget and Accounting 
Procedures Act--the utilization of the best business 
practices in the day-to-day management of our Government . "9 
OSD developed RMS/PRIME ove~ a period of almost one 
and one-half years . Within the Navy a full scale test, or 
"demonstration" of PRIME was conducted in fiscal year 1967 
at the u. S. Naval Air Station, Quonset Point, Rhode Island . 
The test commenced shortly after the beginning of the fiscal 
year . In December, 1966, after the test had been underway 
for nearly six months, the following evaluation of the test 
and of RMS was rendered: 
9Lyndon B. Johnson, The President of the United 
States of America, Memorandum to Heads of Departments and 
Agencies, Washington, D. c. , May 24, 1966 . 
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It is the considered opinion of this command that 
the effort being expended on the NAS Quonset Point test 
is effort well applied, however , the prototype system, 
while in most respects workable and successful, is not 
yet perfected . It is therefore much too early to come 
to any conclusions on the system. Many areas where con-
siderable additional effort must be applied have been 
highlighted a~d decisions must be made to resolve diffi-
culties for installing base level RMS on a Navy-wide 
basis . It is considered that the system should be sub-jected to the cycli~ events of a full year before attempts 
are made to install it at other stations . Even then like 
stations should be selected and the system installed in 
manageable increments . It is not clear how this can be 
accom lished at all stations by 1 July 1967 . 10 (Emphasis 
Despite the difficulties remaining to be resolved and 
the recommendation for selective and orderly implementation 
of PRIME in the above quotation, OSD planned to implement 
PRIME completely within DOD on July 1, 1967 . As stated by 
OSD in April, 1967, "The one certainty regarding Project PRIME 
is that it represents a decision which has been made . "ll The 
Congress, however, thought otherwise . 
Congressional Reaction to PRIME 
The fiscal year 1968 DOD budget estimates submitted 
to the First Session of the Ninetieth Congress included 
$52,700,000 to install PRIME and operate it for one year, 
much of that amount being for the pay of additional civilian 
lOu. s . , Department of the Navy, Headquarters Naval 
Material Command, Letter of the Chief of Naval Material to 
the Comptroller of the Navy, Subject: Resource Management 
at Station {Base ) Level; evaluation of Washington, D. c. , 
December 1, 1966, p . 3. 
llu. s . , Department of Defense, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense {Comptroller , A Primer on 
Project PRIME, Washington, D. C. , April, 19 7, p. 78 . 
' 
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personnel needed to administer the new systems . The House 
Committee on Appropriations rejected that request in the 
following manner: 
The Committee has deleted funds budgeted in the 
Operation and Maintenance accounts for the so-called 
Resources Management System of the Department of Defense. 
The principal element of this system is known as Project 
PRIME, a proposal to completely alter the character of 
Defense budgeting and accounting so as to bring it in 
consonance with the program system of the Department . 
The Committee is of the opinion that this proposal 
appears to be a case of too much too soon. While it is 
undoubtedly true that significant changes in the budget-
ing and accounting system of the Department of Defense 
should perhaps be accomplished, and this is to some 
extent true of all agencies of the Federal Government, 
what is understood of the proposal under Project PRIME 
would indicate a massive change which to some extent 
would temporarily diminish Congressional control and 
which appears to be proposed for at least partial ini-
tiation without due regard for Congressional expression. 
The Committee directs that there be no such change 
in the budgeting and accounting system of the Department 
of Defense preparatory to the formulation of the fiscal 
year 1969 budget presentation. l2 
The Senate Committee on Appropriations concurred in 
the House action and further rejected an OSD appeal to restore 
$3,500,000 of the amount cut by the House which OSD intended 
to use to finance additional tests of PRIME during fiscal 
year 1968. The Senate Committee did state: 
The committee has no objection to a further test of 
the proposed system as provided for by the House com-
mittee. However, it is the view of the committee that 
12H. Rept. 349. 
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such tests should be funded from available resources 
and the Department's requests for funds to finance 
these tests have been disallowed . l3 
At this point Secretary McNamara acceded partially 
to the wishes of the Congress, but only partially . In a 
letter of August 7, 1967, to the Chairman of the House 
Committee on Appropriations, Secretary McNamara declared 
that the 
••• FY 1969 President ' s Budget will be prepared 
and submitted in the same format as was used in FY 1968. 
. . • our appropria tion accounting will produce reports 
that conform to the appropriation and budget activity 
structure set for4h in the FY 1969 budget as submitted 
to the Congress . l 
Secretary McNamara further stated, however, that 
Internally, we shall use a management control system that 
focuses on expenses classified according to the organiza-
tion units responsible for incurring them. We shall of 
course be glad to furnish the Subcommittee such informa-
tion from this system as it desires, recognizing that 
this information would be in addition to, and not a sub-
stitute for, the appropriation accounting information 
mentioned above •• •• we shall plan on submitting the 
FY 1970 budget for operations in a form that summarizes 
proposed operating expenses by major organizational 
entities and programs.l5 
Secretary McNamara ' s stated intention to proceed with 
the internal implementation of RMS/PRIME quoted above provoked 
the following statement on the floor of the Senate by Senator 
John Stennis of the Senate Committee on Appropriations: 
13u. s . , Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, 
De artment of Defense A ro riation Bill 1968, 90th Cong . , 
st Sess . , 7, S. Rept. 9 o accompany H.R . 10738, p. 22. 
l4Robert S. McNamara Secretary of Defense, Letter to 
Ron . George H. Mahon, Chairman, House Committee on Appropria-
tions, Washington, D. C. , August 7, 1967. 
15Ibid . 
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" when funds for a specific purpose are disallowed, • • • 
and the report of the committee clearly states the intent of 
such action, the Department of Defense should follow accord-
ingly . It is clear in this instance the Department of Defense 
is not following the full intent • • • • n16 And further: 
II the Department of Defense has seen fit to ignore the • • • 
actions of the House Appropriations Committee , the House of 
Representatives, and the Senate Appropriations Committee in 
disallowing these funds and intends to proceed with at least 
partial implementation • • • • nl7 
On August 18, 1967, the DOD Appropriations Bill, 1968, 
reached the floor of the Senate . Senator Stennis offered an 
amendment to the Bill which, with minor modifications, was 
adopted by the Senate on August 21, 1967, as follows: 
During the current fiscal year none of the funds 
available to the Department of Defense may be used to 
install or utilize any new "cost-based" or "expense-
based" system or systems for accounting, including 
accounting results for the purposes prescribed by section 
113 (a ) (4 ) of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act 
of 1950 {31 u . s . c . 66a (a ) (4)) , until 15 days after the 
Comptroller General of the United States {after consult-
ation with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget ) has 
reported to the Congress that in his opinion such system 
or systems are designed to: (1 ) meet the requirements 
of all applicable laws governing budgeting, accounting, 
a.nd the administration of public funds and the standards 
and procedures established pursuant thereto; ( 2) provide 
for uniform application to the extent practicable through-
out the Department of Defense; and ( 3) prevent violations 8 of the antideficiency statute (R. S. 3679; 31 u . s . c . 665 ).1 
16u. s . , Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess . , 
1967, CXIII, No . 132, p . 811844 . 
17Ibid. , No . 133, p . S11924 . 
18Ibid . , p. 811923 . 
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On August 23 ~ 1967 ~ the Conference Committee on the 
Bill accepted the Senate amendment but lengthened the waiting 
period between General Accounting Office ( GAO ) approval and 
imple~entation to 45 days ~ as opposed to the 15 days origin-
ally proposed . l9 It is significant to note that this amend-
ment is legislation attached to an appropriation bill , which 
is contrary to the general rules of both houses of the Con-
gress . The strong feelings of the Congress against RMS/ PRIME 
evidenced by Senator Stennis ' s statements brought about sus -
pension of the general rules and PRIME was quite forcefully 
and effectively halted . 
Current Status of PRIME 
Many of the minor or procedural changes of PRIME have 
already been implemented The large conceptual changes ~ how-
ever~ are still under the Congressional prohibition. Addi-
tional , larger tests of PRIME a~e currently in progress at 
major installations and commands of the military departments 
and the u. S. Marine Corps , as permitted by the Congress . 
To increase the probability of reducing or eliminating objec -
tions to PRIME, representatives of the GAO are active, on- site 
participants in the tests . GAO appears to be basically 
satisfied that PRIME can qualify for acceptance under t he 
provisions of the amendment quoted previously . 
19u. s. , House, Conference Committee on the 1968 
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill , Appro¥riations for 
the De artment of Defense for 1 68, 90th Cons., st Sess . , 
H. Rep No . o accompany H. • 10738, p . 8 . 
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Current plans call for GAO to review PRIME completely 
about February 1, 1968. GAO fin~ings and recommendations 
will be submitted to the Congress about Ma.rch 1, 1968. Bar-
ring any unexpected difficulties, Congressional approval 
should follow shortly thereafter and PRIME would be imple-
mented fully on July 1, 1968. The Navy has prepared all the 
necessary working procedures manuals and instructions , has 
conducted extensive orientation and training of the personnel 
who will be involved with PRIME, and stands ready to operate 
under PRIME when directed . 
PRIME is not .stati.c and is undergoing continuous minor 
revision as the results of the tasts point out areas which 
require modification. Some of the problems presented in this 
study are even now under review and are expected to be altered 
before July 1, 1968. The reader must therefore understand 
that PRIME is not inflexible but can be changed when neces-
sary . While frustrating to PRIME ' s planners, the delay 
imposed by the Congress may work to the advantage of PRIME 
by providing an additional year in which PRIME is being re-
fined. Equally important, the extra year has allowed addi-
tional training and exposure to PRIME at the operating level , 
and it is the operating level that will ultimately determine 
the success or failure of PRIME . 
CHAPTER III 
THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PRIME 
PRIME is a conglomeration of changes, large and 
small, procedural and conceptual, which are intended to pro-
vide an integrated system of broad management control to 
military managers . Not content to merely satisfy the letter 
of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 and 
associated legislation , PRIME seeks to alter basic military 
management philosophy by replacing existing military manage -
ment control systems in part or completely with systems based 
on almost totally different techniques and theories . The 
ultimate objective of PRIME is to create a wholly new manage-
ment environment based on concepts developed for commercial 
enterprises . This chapter will present the objectives of 
PRIME as promulgated by its planners and discuss and analyze 
the theoretical framework upon which PRIME is built . Existing 
military management concepts will be briefly contrasted so as 
to place PRIME in the proper perspective . 
Objectives 
The basic , official DOD directive which establishes 
RMS defines "resources" as man, material, services , and money, 
and "resource management systems" as those systems which 
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collect and process recurring quantitative (monetary or 
nonmonetary) information for management use . l That directive 
states that the objectives of RMS are: 
To provide managers at all levels within the Depart-
ment of Defense with information that will help them 
assure that resources are obtained and used effectively 
and efficiently in the accomplishment of Department of 
Defense objectives . 
To provide information that is useful in the 
formulation of objectives and plans . 
To provide data to support program proposals and 
requests for funds . 
To provide a means of assuring that statutes, 
agreements with Congressional committees, and other 
requirements emanating from outside the Department of 
Defense relating to resources, are complied with . 2 
The objectives quoted above are broad and general and 
provide little concrete working guidance . More detailed and 
specific direction relating to the areas that are covered by 
PRIME is provided as follows: 
Programming and budgeting systems will: 
1 . Be correlated as fully as possible with each 
other and with management accounting systems, using 
common data elements and definitions, translatable 
structures and non-duplicative procedures and schedules . 
2. Be organized so as to focus on the goals, 
purposes, and outputs of the Department of Defense , and 
on the costs of achieving these goals . 
Systems for management of resources of operating 
activities will: 
lu. s . , Department of Defense, Instruction 7000. 1, 
"Resource Management Systems of the Department of Defense," 
August 22, 1966, p . 1 . 
2Ibid . , p . 3 . 
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1 . Focus on outputs and on resources used ~ i ~ e ~ 
expenses . 
2 . Focus on managers who are responsible for 
effective and efficient utilization of resources ~ 
3 . Focus on actual performance in relation to 
planned performance . 
4 . Use expense operating budgets and accounting as 
a primary aid in management control at each organizational 
level . 
5. Use working capital to hold resources in suspense 
in both time and place between the acquisition of re-
sources and their consumption ~ 3 
Two additional items of policy pertaining to RMS contained in 
the basic directive are worthy of note : "Each sys t em or sub-
system will be compatible with other systems; ••• the value 
of information obtained must exceed the cost of collecting 
it; • • u4 . . 
Principal authority within OSD for the design and 
installation of RMS is assigned to the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller ) , ASD (C). ASD (C)' s charter ~o direct 
and control DOD efforts toward planning and implementation of 
RMS is broad and inclusive . The only information systems 
excluded from RMS by the basic directive are systems which 
cannot be related directly or indirectly to resources , such as 
systems for the collection and processing of military intelli-
gence, tactical doctrine , and the like . 
II 
• • • 
The primary responsibility of ASD {C) in RMS is 
to provide for the development of systems that will 
3Ibid. , pp . 3-4 . 
4 ill_c!. , p . 5 . 
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help managers do their jobs . "5 (Emphasis mine .) In this 
connection, ASD (C) states that the central objectives of 
RMS and PRIME are: 
11 
• • • to aid operating managers at all levels by 
providing them with: 
1 . Clearly defined goals . 
2. Some added discretion in determining the mix of 
resources used to achieve these goals . 
3. A meaningful way to measure how well goals are 
met, and how efficiently resources are being used to 
meet the goals . 
4. Even6stronger motivation than at present to manage well . 
The theme that runs through the objectives which are 
quoted in the preceding paragraphs and through all other 
literature pertaining to PRIME is that the overall goal of 
PRIME is to give military managers an all-purpose tool to 
improve their ability to manage resources effectively and ef-
ficiently, which will ultimately result in increased decen-
tralization of Defense decision-making. The two halves of 
that tool are the measurement of inputs, resources consumed, 
and the measurement of outputs, performance . With those two 
mutually dependent and vital elements, PRIME seeks to bring a 
higher degree of rationality to military decision-making than 
now exists, by giving greater visibility into the consequences 
of alternative choices for the use of resources . The k~ys to 
the decision-making process sought by PRIME are manageriel 
5~. , p . 6 . 
6A Primer on Project PRIME, p . 12. 
, 
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motivation, which presumably will drive the decision maker 
to make the optimum choice indicated by the system, and more 
freedom to actually make the choice . 
Concepts and Assumptions 
The changes to be introduced by PRIME are based on 
certain concepts , which are in turn supported by or dependent 
upon certain assumptions . Those concepts and assumptions , as 
viewed by this writer, are presented in the following para-
graphs . 
"Full Costing. "--The single most :lmportant concept 
upon which PRIME is built is the accountant ' s concept of 
"full costing. " Full costing under PRIME would charge mili-
tary organizational units that are identifiable in the account-
ing system at the lowest level with virtually all costs asso-
ciated with their operations, and even their existence. The 
intent of PRIME is not only to provide more complete cost 
information for programming and budgeting purposes but is also 
to use full costing as a means of arousing motivation to manage 
resources efficiently at the operating level . Dr . Anthony 
explained the concept as follows: 
The focus is on expenses, that is on the resources 
consumed by an organization unit in carrying out their 
part of the program •••• By expenses, I mean personnel 
costs, military as well as civilians; I mean the supplies 
used by the organization, including spare parts and other 
consumable material now carried in procurement accounts; 
and I mean the services received by the organization, in-
cluding maintenance, repair, and services received from 
other units within DOD . By the word measurable, I mean 
to e~clude allocated and prorated costs . 
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The costs of military personnel must be charged to 
the units where the personnel work . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Our long range goal is to charge 100 per cent of 
measurable expense.7 
Concerning the operating manager under the full 
costing concept, Dr . Anthony further explained: 
In brief, the objective of the system is to not only 
permit, but to encourage, to motivate, managers to manage 
the use of their resources--their total resources, not 
just a piece of them. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
•• • the manager ' s flexibility in deciding on what 
resources to use should be increased . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(The syste@ should, moreover, motivate managers to 
bemore concerned about the use of resources, and there-
fore lessen the need for exhortation, inspection, 
specified constraints, and other devices that
8
are now 
used as a substitute for built-in motivation. 
PRIME ' s concept of full costing is in opposition to 
the concepts of "direct costing," by which the costs of mili-
tary units are presently financed and accounted for at the 
operating level for management control purposes, and full 
costing, by which all relevant costs are assigned to military 
units for planning, programming, and budgeting purposes at 
higher levels. Under existing procedures, military units are 
------·------------~~----------~----
7Robert N. Anthony, Address , "The What and Why of 
Project PRIME," to the Defense Management Systems Course, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif . , August 5, 1966. 
8rbid . 
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charged only for the direct costs which are incurred in 
operations and which can be controlled to some extent by the 
unit commander . Costs which the unit commander can control 
usually vary directly with the level of operations but may 
include relatively long-term, fixed costs. Controllable 
costs charged to the unit under the direct costing concept 
are equally valid costs for planning, programming, and budget-
ing. Other costs, such as those applicable to military per-
sonnel, are managed, funded, and accounted for at higher 
levels. Those resources are provided to the using level 
without charge and the accounting system does not reflect a 
cost charge directly to the user at that level. Costs of 
this nature which can be directly identified to a unit are 
assigned, however, to the unit for planning, programming, 
and budgeting purposes at higher levels. Other costs which 
cannot be directly identified to any given military unit, 
such as the costs of central overhaul and repair of major 
equipment items, are statistically allocated to the unit 
level for planning, programming, and budgeting, also at the 
higher levels . In summary, therefore, the present system 
charges only controllable costs directly to the unit level 
for management control purposes but recognizes and accounts 
for full costs at higher levels for planning, programming, 
and budgeting. 
The factor which determines to whom the charge will 
be placed in the existing systems for purposes of management 
control is the control, not the use or consumption of 
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resources. Those commanders who control resources are 
generally responsible for the effective and efficient allo-
cation of resources toward results. Recipients of 1'free" 
resources are placed under nonmonetary constraints, such as 
limitations on the number of military personnel assigned to 
the recipient unit, by the controlling commander. Under 
PRIME, units would be charged for all resources received, 
priced at transfer prices--actual costs, where available, or 
standard costs. 
Concerning the difference between controllable and 
non-controllable costs at the user level, Dr . Anthony de-
clared: II it is an easy matter to structure reports 
so that the controllable expenses are separated from the 
others . 11 9 The expectation evidenced by Dr . Anthony ' s ex-
planation of the full costing concept is that knowledge of 
costs, regardless of control , will motivate unit commanders 
--managers--to be moreefficient in the use of resources and 
to seek alternate ways of achieving their assigned tasks. 
This expectation assumes that knmvledge of costs alone, 
regardless of control, will provide the stimulus to work 
toward efficiency and that no motivation to be efficient now 
exists. The latter part of that assumption was previously 
asserted by Dr . Anthony in the memorandum referred to in the 
Introduction as follows : "At present , managers are adequately 
motivated to get their job done well (that is, to be effective ) 
9rbid. 
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but they are inadequately motivated to get the job done at 
an optimum cost that is, to be efficient ) . ulO 
Integration of Programming, Budgeting, and Accountin~. 
--Before PRIME, DOD programming, budgeting, and accounting 
systems were each structured differently . The DOD programming 
system analyzed defense activities by functions and total 
costs with only secondary reference to the details of organi-
zations and costs . The DOD budget was divided organization-
ally by military depart ment and cast in terms of the appropri-
ation structure and budget activities (major divisions of 
appropriations ) by which the Congress enacts funds for the 
DOD . The DOD budget was connected to the programming system 
only by supporting analyses . The accounting systems internal 
to the military departments accounted for appropriations along 
organizational lines without any direct reference to the pro-
gramming system. Estimated period costs of operations neces-
sary to develop and support budgets and program analyses were 
obtained from separate but parallel cost accounting systems 
for costs funded at the operating level, and from statistical 
methods or application of standard costs for costs funded at 
higher levels , such as military personnel costs . 
Neither the present appropriation nor military 
organizational structures are directly relatable to the DOD 
program structure . Conversion of information to or from the 
program structure, therefore , required allocation and 
----------------------------------------------
lOAnthony to McNamara. 
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proration of some costs, which lessened the absolute accuracy 
and reliability of such information . Complicating the situa-
tion even further, before PRIME there was no uniform, explicit 
criteria for the identification of military units to DOD 
programs . In addition, each military department had its own 
definitions by which costs were differentiated between invest-
ment (capital ) costs and current operating costs and its own 
procedures to classify costs by function and end use . While 
the differences among the military departments were sometimes 
small, they did lessen the usefulness of comparison of costs 
within the program structure and make the choice between com-
peting programs and military department more difficult to make . 
Procedurally, PRIME solves much of the above problem 
by establishing a series of uniform program and cost defini-
tions and criteria and revising the program structure itself . 
PRIME will totally change the situation described above , how-
ever, by restructuring the budgeting and accounting systems 
to conform to the DOD programming structure . The budget as 
prepared by the military departments and consolidated by the 
OSD for presentation to the Congress will be arrayed entirely 
by DOD programs and even the appropriation structure by the 
Congress would be changed . The assumptions implicit in this 
concept are that the information obtained from the present 
budget and accounting systems is too inaccurate or unreliable 
to use and that nothing short of total system change can be 
done to improve the quality of that information . 
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To provide either program-oriented or organizationally-
oriented cost information to support the revised budget, 
Dr . Anthony introduced to the DOD the "responsibility center" 
concept . Dr . Anthony defines a responsibility center a.s 
n • • • an organizational unit • •• headed by a supervisor 
who is responsible f'or the activities of the unit . "11 The 
responsibility centers and subsidiary accounting entities in 
the military departments are to be so structured as to be able 
to provide cost information for either, or both organizational 
and program uses , the so-called "cost building block11 12 con-
cept . While both of these changes are largely procedural, 
they have forced the Navy to reexamine and alter its organi-
zations for funding and accounting . 
Flexibility - Decentralized Decision Making . --Although 
virtually no reference is made to this concept in official 
directives, much reference to increased managerial flexibility 
is made in the unofficial literature relating to PRIME . As 
pointed out by Dr . Anthony in the speech quoted previously in 
this chapter, PRIME seeks to decentralize the military 
decision-making process by increasing the flexibility of oper-
ating managers in choosing what resources to use . This con-
cept is necessarily based on the assumption that operating 
11Robert N. Anthony , Management Control Systems 4 Cases and Readings (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irw1n, 
Inc . , 1965 ), p . 165 . 
12Robert N. Anthony, Management Accounting, Text and 
Cases {Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc . , 1964), 
p. 443 . 
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managers are capable of making decisions of better quality 
than are presently being made at higher.levels . It further 
assumes that decisions made at lower levels will be in the 
best interest of the organization as a whole in each case. 
Finally, the idea of decentralization of decision-making must 
always assume that the management control system will give the 
decision maker the appropriate signal for the correct decision. 
An example of this type of decision-making cited often 
by PRIME ' s proponents is that of the "motor pool" decision . 
PRIME envisions the user of vehicles from a motor pool review-
ing his requirements and the costs involved and correctly 
determining whether to use motor pool vehicles, vehicles pro-
cured from outside civilian sources, or no vehicles at all, 
based on the immediate cost considerations only . 
Measurement of Output . --Both the official and the un-
officia.l literature of PRIME are replete with references to 
the objective of PRIME to measure the output of military units. 
Many of those references have already been presented in this 
study and there is no need for further amplification. The 
concept which PRIME asserts is that military units have an 
"output" and that that output is the index of performance 
against which costs should be evaluated . The assumptions 
inherent in this concept are as follows: 
1 . That military units have an output for a period 
or point in time which can be measured by an objective, gen-
erally quantifiable index which is meaningful to managers at 
all levels and which truly describes the real performance of 
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the military unit . 
2 . That the output of a military unit relates to 
the costs of resources consumed by the unit . 
3. That the relationship between the costs and the 
output of a military unit can be reduced to a means by which 
changes in outputs can be predicted from changes in inputs. 
Planning for and implementation of the measurement of 
inputs, resources consumed or used, has proceeded apace for 
over two years . The measurement of outputs , however is still 
in the early developmental stage and on a conceptual level 
only at this time . A subsequent chapter of this study will 
discuss the planning theories for output measurement as they 
currently exist . 
Accrual Accounting . --Appropriations enacted by the 
Congress are expressed in terms of authority to obligate the 
Federal Government to pay sums of money for goods or services 
ordered from commercial or other governmental sources during 
the fiscal year . The Congress has enacted punitive legisla-
tion, the Anti-Deficiency Act, R. S. 3679, to insure that the 
recipients of appropriations obligate only the amounts appro-
priated and only for the purposes specified in the appropria-
tion act . To that end, most of the DOD accounting systems are 
oriented toward accounting for obligations . Since obligations 
at one point in time are promises to pay and do not necessar-
ily relate to the actual point in time of the receipt and 
consumption or use of goods or services , an ac-counting system 
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for obligations may not express the actual cost of goods and 
services consumed or used during any specific period of time. 
PRIME proposes to change the DOD obligation accounting systems 
to an actual, accrued expense basis and confine obligation 
accounting to the military department level . A supporting 
accounting device to facilitate accrual accounting is the 
"stock fund" account which will hold goods in suspense ac-
counts until the actual time of use or consumption . Stock 
fund accounts are not new to the military departments but have 
not been used to the extent made necessary by PRIME . 
There are two assumptions by which PRIME justifies 
the need for change to accrual accounting . First, PRIME as-
sumes that there is a difference between obligations incurred 
for a specific purpose and the actual expenses incurred for 
that purpose . This difference is assumed to be of such magni-
tude as to warrant change to the system. Second, PRIME 
assumes that the Congress and executive branch managers do 
not have "control" of actual expenses incurred by operating 
units during any specified period of time . Accrual account-
ing and revised administrative control of funds, as discussed 
in the following paragraph, would presumably provide that 
control . 
Administrative Control of Funds . --Existing military 
accounting systems place responsibility under the Anti-
Deficiency Act on the managers responsible for controlling 
obligations . PRIME seeks to change this procedure by placing 
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the responsibility on the managers who use resources as well . 
To achieve this objective, PRIME would merge the two main 
operating appropriations, "Operations and Maintenance," which 
finances the costs of goods, services, and civilian personnel, 
and rrMilitary Personnel," which, as its title implies, fi-
nances the costs of military personnel, into one supra-
appropriation, "Operations . " Operating budgets granted to 
military units under the one appropriation would carry with 
them the responsibility to comply with the Anti-Deficiency 
Act . Coupled with accrual accounting, this concept would give 
the Congress and the higher management levels of the executive 
branch the greater control over the actual operations of mili-
tary units that PRIME ' s planners believe is required . This 
concept of PRIME has undergone considerable change because of 
the reaction of the Congress to PRIME and the concern expressed 
by the Congress specifically in regards to the Anti-Deficiency 
Act . The basic consideration has not been resolved as of the 
date of this study but will be examined in detail in Chapter V. 
A Brief Summary of the Objectives and Concepts of PRIME 
In the simplest of terms, PRIME seeks to establish a 
management environment in the DOD centered on financial or 
quantitative information, using techniques and concepts bor-
rowed from commercial enterprises . In a statement which needs 
no further elaboration, Dr . Anthony quite adequately sums the 
objectives and concepts of PRIME as follows : 
Reduced to fundamentals, the manager in a service 
organization [ in the DOIU has the same function as the 
manager in a profit-seeking organization . The organi-
zation has a job to do, and it is the function of the 
manager to see to it that the job gets done well, and 
that resources are used efficiently in getting it done . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
In applying this general idea to the problem in 
government, we draw upon and adapt concepts developed 
in industry . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
~Je try to create the psychological stimulus provided 
by the profit motive by setting up competitive situations 
wherever it is feasible to do so--competitive in the sense 
that one Defense organization competes with another , and 
also in the sense that a Defense organization competes 
with outside organizations . l3 
13Robert N. Anthony "The Challenge of Service 
Accounting, " An Address to the American Accounting Association, 
August 30 , 1967. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE PROCEDURAL CHANGES OF PRIME 
Many of the changes gathered under the title of PRIME 
are very basic , procedural changes which could have been ac-
complished, regardless of their official designation as parts 
of PRIME . Many of the changes have, in fact, been instituted 
prior to, or despite , the general prohibition on the imple-
mentation of PRIME by the Congress . The procedural changes 
have encountered little difficulty in implementation and have 
not created any noticeable dissatisfactions or objections in 
the military departments . This does not imply that the 
changes are not of significance . To the contrary, the pro-
cedural changes of PRIME have brought about certain positive 
improvements to the Defense programming, budgeting, and ac-
counting systems which have been needed for a long time . 
Since this study purports to be an examination of PRIME as a 
whole , objectivity demands that these changes be enumerated 
and their merits be given adequate consideration. Subsequent 
paragraphs of this chapter will discuss the procedural changes 
of PRIME and one major change in the U. s. Navy which, al-
though not formally required by PRIME, necessarily preceded 
any Navy efforts to effectively implement the management 
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control techniques proposed by PRIME . That change will be 
discussed separately, and first to emphasize its importance . 
The Reorganization of the Navy 
The military commander is a "manager" in the broadest 
meaning of the word and PRIME accentuates the synonymity of 
command and management . The authority and responsitality to 
control the resources needed to accomplish a given task would 
seem to be a necessary concomitance of operational military 
command. Military commanders must be aware of all the conse-
quences, including costs, of their decisions concerning oper-
ations, and should have the authority to determine the alloca-
tion of military resources based on operational considerations. 
Before June 1, 1966, such was not the case in the u. s. Navy . 
In what has been probably the single most significant 
change to the organization of the Navy, the Chief of Naval 
Operations was on June 1, 1966, interposed in the chain of 
command between the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of 
Naval Material, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Chief, 
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery . Prior to that change, the 
Chief of Naval Operations exercised command only over the 
fleet operating forces, and then only in military matters such 
as operations, security, intelligence, communications, disci-
pline, and the like . Logistics support, including all funding 
of the operating forces and supporting shore stations, was 
provided by the three subordinate Chiefs mentioned, who re-
ported directly to the Secretary of the Navy . The Chief of 
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Naval Operations, therefore, had no direct voice in the 
management of the resources he needed to conduct naval opera-
tions. This unusual situation existed in the Navy for almost 
125 years and resisted repeated attempts at reform until the 
growing pressures for change, generated no doubt in part by 
the planning for PRIME, finally forced the reorganization . l 
The former separation of command and support channels 
flowed downward to the lowest levels of the Navy . Commanders 
were often in the unique position of having to answer to two 
different higher authorities who did not always give compat-
ible directions to the commanders~ Operating decisions were 
sometimes dictated by support constraints alone and decision-
making was hampered accordingly . The June 1, 1966, reorgani-
zation corrected that situation . The Chief of Naval Operations 
now has the authority and responsibility for Navy financial 
management . Funding channels now conform to command lines . 2 
The importance of the realignment of Navy funding 
channels is attested to by the fact that the Congress appro-
priated $2,500,000 to establish the Fleet Command Management 
System, the title of the revised funding system, while strik-
ing out the Navy ' s $16,500,000 share of the $52 , 700,000 
requested by OSD to implement RMS/ PRIME. Established in the 
lThomas W. Ray, "The Bureaus Go On Forever ••• ," 
United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XCIV, No . 1, Whole 
No . 779 (January, 1968). 
2u . s . , Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Navy, "Resource Management Systems Bulletin Number 
Two," NAVSO P-3038, Washington, D. C. , November 27, 1967, p . i. 
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Office of the Chief of Naval Operations is the Budget Office 
(CNOBO }, to perform command financial management functions . 
The Fleet Resources Office (FRO} has been established within 
the Chief of Naval Material organization to act as agent for 
CNOBO ur.til CNOBO acquires the expertise required to fully 
assume all the responsibilities formerly performed by the 
Chief of Naval Material . As the CNOBO grows and matures, 
the FRO is expected to diminish in size and importance until 
its eventual demise . 3 
Programming Changes 
Under the aegis of PRIME, ASD (C ) has instituted 
revis ed procedures for the review and change of DOD programs 
contained in the DOD Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). The 
FYDP is the formal, approved plan for military forces pro-
jected to at least five years in the future . Program issues 
which would have a major qualitative or quantitative impact 
on military forces in the FYDP are identified annually prior 
to the beginning of the DOD budget cycle . Such issues, en-
titled "Major Force-Oriented Issues , "4 are brought to the 
attention of the highest levels of management in OSD and the 
military departments earlier under the new procedures than 
3Robert H. Conn, Captain, U. S. N. Deputy Director, 
Chief of Naval Operations Budget Office, Address to the Stu-
dents of the Navy Graduate Financial Management Program, The 
George Washington University, Washington, D. c. , December 13, 
1967. 
4u. s . , Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller ) , Memorandum, Subject : 
"Interim Operating Procedures No . 1 - Major Force Oriented 
I s sues," Washington , D. c. , June 29, 1966. 
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under the old, and in a more systematic manner . This change 
affords top management more time to resolve major issues 
during the budget cycle and focuses attention to the really 
important issues which require resolution . Another change 
involves the way in which the FYDP is changed during the 
budget cycle . "Program Change Requests"5 {PCR ' s ) may be sub-
mitted at any time they are considered necessary so as to 
provide greater flexibility in both the formulation and exe-
cution of the budget . While neither of these changes repre-
sents a wholly new or different procedure, they do bring 
refinements to the programming system that will facilitate 
more orderly, systematic functioning of the DOD planning and 
programming process . 
Probably the crucial determinant of the success of a 
programming system is the definition of programs, themselves . 
"The way in which a program structure is set up • • • can have 
a profound effect on the decisions that are reached, so that 
the design of programs should be regarded as an important part 
of the decision-making process,"6 states Arthur Smithies . In 
recognition of the fact that gradual changes to U. s . Defense 
policies and strategies had occurred over the years since the 
inception of PPB, PRIME revised the original nine Defense pro-
grams to ten more meaningful aggregations . The former programs 
5u. s . , Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense {Comptroller ) , Memorandum, Subject: 
"Interim Operating Procedures No . 2 - Program Change Requests 
{PCR ) ," Washington, D. c. , June 30, 1966 . 
6srnithies, p . 41 . 
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"Strategic Retaliatory Forces" and "Continental Air/ Missile 
Defense Forces" have been combined into one program, 
"Strategic Forces . " A new program, 11 Specialized Forces," 
has been established to include activities directly related 
to combat forces, such as intelligence, security, communica-
tions, and the like . The old nondescript program "General 
Support" has been broken into three more informative cate-
gories: "Logistics," "Personnel Support," and "Administra-
tion . " The former program "Retired Pay" described nothing 
directly relatable to future national defense and has been 
completely eliminated and the costs distributed proportion-
ately to other programs as part of military personnel costs . 
This change of PRIME would appear to have greatly strengthened 
the Defense decision-making process at higher levels . This 
change further demonstrates that OSD is aware of the need for 
flexibility in program definition and is willing to change 
programs as the environment requires . 
PRIME further categorizes the programs as "Independ-
ent" or "Dependent . " Independent programs are those programs 
which are concerned directly with the defense of the nation 
and which may be examined and acted upon independently . 
Dependent programs, the three support programs discussed 
above, vary as a function of the independent programs . PRIME, 
therefore, has pointed out that changes in the independent 
programs will induce a change in the dependent programs and 
that dependent programs cannot be examined without 
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consideration of the independent programs that they support . 
Before PRIME) no such differentiation was explicitly made . 
Probably the most valuable change to the programming 
system is that approximately 1 , 100 precisely-defined, standard 
program "elements" have been established to correspond with 
organizational units . 7 A program element is the smallest 
cost-collection entity in the DOD programming and budgeting 
system. Before PRIME, the program elements were designed 
without regard for the military organizations, hence the 
costing difficulties discussed in Chapter III . While there 
are a few military units that have unique, or multiple and 
diverse functions that make them difficult to fit in any on~ 
program, by far the majority of units can be so identified . 
Bringing program elements into conformity with organizational 
entities will enable the incorporation of the "cost building 
block" and "responsibility center" concepts into the military 
accounting systems . 
In this connection, the Navy screened Unit Identifi-
cation Codes {UIC ' s ) , the numerical codes by which organiza-
tion units are identified in the accounting systems, against 
the standard program element definitions . UIC ' s have been 
identified to one program element and "dictionaries"8 compiled 
7Meyer Tartasky, "Improvements to the Programming 
System, Department of Defense," U. S. Department of Defense, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) , 
~ect PRIME Handbook , Washington, D. c., June , 1967, p . 15 . 
Bu. s . , Department of the Navy, Office of the Comp-
troller of the Navy, "Resource Management Systems Bulletin 
Number One," Washington, D. c. , September 8, 1967, p . 4. 
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to provide the means to cross refer UIC ' s to either organi-
zational unit or program element The Navy accounting system 
can now, therefore, provide financial information for either 
organizational or program purposes . It must be noted that 
while this capability is exactly as envisioned by the cost 
building block concept, it in no way directly assures the 
validity or reliability of information so accumulated 
PRIME ' s changes to the programming system listed in 
this section all contribute to the increased effectiveness of 
the system. The writer must point out, however , that changes 
to the programming system are primarily for the benefit of 
OSD or higher management levels . No benefits directly visible 
to managers will accrue at the operating levels since none of 
the changes will essentially alter any of the existing pro-
cedures at the operating levels . 
Standardization of Expense Data 
As pointed out previously, cost accounting systems of 
the separate military departments differed in the categories 
in which costs were collected by function and end use . To 
bring uniformity to the process, .ASD (C) promulgated thirteen 
definitions of functional categories, such as "mission 
operations," "maintenance of material , " and seventeen defin-
itions of end use elements of expense , such as "civilian per-
sonnel , " "u.tllities and rent," and "printing and reproduction ."9 
9u . s . , Department of Defense, Instruction 7220. 20, 
"Expense Data Requirements," December 20, 1966 . 
, 
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Accounting systems of the military departments must be 
structured upon those definitions so as to collect costs by 
expense element , within functional categories, and further 
within program element . This change will permit comparison 
of costs among the military departments with the assurance 
that, at the least, the definitions of the costs and the 
understandings of what the costs represent are the same among 
all participants . 
Distinction Between Investments and Expenses 
To further facilitate comparisons of costs among 
military departments and to satisfy the long-standing recom-
mendations that costs be distinguished between investments 
and expenses , OSD has established absolute criteria by which 
costs may be classified to one or the other of the two, 
mutually- exclusive types . lO The decision rules by which 
managers will classify the two costs are explicit and de-
tailed . One conditional , arbitrary rule included in the OSD 
directive on the subject may produce some unexpected and dys-
functional managerial behavior . That rule and its possible 
consequences will be discussed at length in the context of 
the larger full costing problem examined in Chapter V. 
Nevertheless, a standard procedure now exists to provide for 
clearly- defined differentiation of investment and expenses in 
programming, budgeting, and accounting throughout the DOD. 
lOu. s . , Department of Defense, Instruction 7040. 5, 
"Definition of Expenses and Investment Costs," September 1, 
1966. 
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Purification of Appropriations 
In addition to establishing investment and expense 
cost criteria, DOD Instruction 7040 . 5 directs that expenses 
only will be financed by the Operations and Maintenance and 
Military Personnel appropriations, and by no other appro-
priation. Investments will be financed by Procurement and 
Military Construction appropriations, and no other. 11 The 
criteria established by OSD differ in many respects from the 
criteria formerly applied in the Navy . In fact, Navy criteria 
were not embodied in any one set of decision rules but were 
individually established by each technical bureau or office 
for the particular material under its control . Consequently, 
considerable adjustment of items between appropriations has 
been required, the "purification" of appropriations. The 
effect in the Navy alone has been the transfer of approxi-
mately 550,000 line items of material with a dollar value of 
about $1,100,000,000 . 12 The ultimate effect of the purifica-
tion of appropriations is that the appropriation structure 
itself now segregates investments from expenses. Budgets to 
the Congress, therefore, can be analyzed separately for the 
two types of costs, satisfying the recommendation to that end 
which has been outstanding for over fifty years . 
llrbid., p . 2 . 
12william H. Johnson, Commander, U. S.N. , Special 
Projects Division, Director of Financial Services, Office of 
the Comptroller of the Navy, in an Address to the Students of 
the Navy Graduate Financial Management Program, The George 
Washington University, Washington, D. c., November 15, 1967 . 
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Because of PRIME, the Navy Stock Fund is to be extended to 
some eighty additional naval activities in fiscal year 1968 
in anticipation of implementation of PRIME on July 1, 1968.14 
Industrial Funds . --Industrial funds provide the 
working capital for industrial or commercial-type activities, 
such as shipyards, printing plants, overhaul and repair 
facilities, etc. As with stock funds, industrial funds are 
reimbursed from the operating funds of units which receive 
services from the industrial activity. The industrial fund 
provides the ideal mechanism to achieve PRIME ' s goal of 
charging full costs to military units for services received 
from other units . In the Navy, again as with stock funds, 
the industrial fund has already been extensively applied. 
As of 1960, sixty-two naval activities were financed under 
the Navy Industrial Fund . l5 Only twenty-seven additional 
activities have or will be industrially funded because of 
PRIME. 16 
A Summary on Procedural Changes 
The changes presented in this Chapter will bring 
about important improvements to DOD programming, budgeting, 
and accounting systems. The programming process is more 
14 
"Resov.rce Management Systems Bulletin Number u.s. , 
Two, II p. 12 . 
15u. s. , Financial Mana~ement in the Navy~ p. 12. 
16 
"Resource Management Systems Bulletin Number u.s. , 
Two," p. 10. 
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systematic and focuses more attention to management by 
exception . The cost building block concept is a reality 
and military accounting systems should now have the capa-
bility to provide financial information for almost any 
programming, budgeting, or organizational need . Costs are 
uniformly defined throughout the DOD and working capital 
funds will enhance the value and meaning of reported costs. 
All of the changes except for application of working capital 
funds at certain facilities have been implemented . Since 
none of the PRIME changes represents a departure from 
existing military management philosophy, no difficulty in 
operating under the revised procedures can be foreseen . It 
must be noted, however , that only the reorganization of the 
Navy promises to change managerial behavior, by greatly 
increasing the authority of operating managers to make 
decisions concerning the allocation of resources . All the 
other changes listed in this Chapter wi l l provide direct, 
visible benefits to top-level management, only. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CONCEPTUAL CHANGES OF PRIME 
The objective of PRIME to establish a more effective 
management control system in DOD is unassailable . The con-
cepts upon which PRIME is based, developed from proved 
commercial applications and the thinking of authoritative 
theoreticians, would also seem invulnerab~e to criticism. 
And yet, there exists the undercurrent of resistance to PRIME 
in the DOD and the very real objections of the Congress to 
PRIME discussed in previous chapters . It is the belief of 
this writer that the sources of the adverse reactions to 
PRIME lie in the changes to management concepts which PRIME 
would introduce into the military management processes. 
To achieve the management control system intended by 
its planners, PRIME would make some changes which represent 
extreme departures from existing military management philoso-
phies . This chapter will examine PRIME ' s conceptual changes, 
as translated into guidelines and directives by OSD and ASD 
(c ), in relation to the practical realities of the situation 
in which PRIME is to function . This study intends to point 
out the areas where PRIME appears to have overlooked or dis-
regarded negative consequences of PRIME or dysfunctional 
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managerial behavior which PRIME may induce . PRIME is founded 
on the basic assumption that existing military resource 
management systems are ineffective, at best . The alternatives 
offered by PRIME, however, may yield no improvement at all . 
Indeed, some parts of PRIME may be harmful in the long run, 
as this chapter will attempt to demonstrate . The following 
paragraphs examine the conceptual changes of PRIME in the 
order of appearance in Chapter III . 
Full Costing 
DOD Instruction 7220 . 22 of January 10, 1967, entitled 
"Accounting System for Operations"1 is the basic OSD directive 
which establishes guidelines for the design of Defense opera-
ting expense accounting systems . Operating expense informa-
tion, gathered under the accrual basis of accounting, is to be 
used to support programming and budgeting and to aid operating 
managers . To bring into being PRIME ' s objectives of full 
costing so as to enhance the use of operating expense informa-
tion, DOD Instruction 7220 . 22 prescribes certain explicit 
requirements . Those requirements will be explored in the 
following paragraphs under the headings of the particular types 
of expenses involved . 
Military Personnel Costs.--Paragraph IV. G. 2 of DOD 
Instruction states : "Active force military personnel services 
will be charged to expense accounts at standard rates in 
1u.s . , Department of Defense, Instruction 7220 . 22, 




accordance with instruction contained in [ DOD Instruction 
7220 . 1~ . "2 That Instruction prescribes detailed procedures 
for " • • • budgeting, accounting, and reporting for the cost 
of military personnel services • • • as an element of operat-
ing costs . "3 Military personnel costs of every DOD organiza-
tional unit based within the continental United States, 
including tactical and combat forces, will be charged as a 
cost of operation of the unit where the military personnel 
services are performed . The costs of military personnel 
stationed outside the continental United States may, at this 
time, be reported in the aggregate by the military departments, 
without detail to the unit level . Costs are to be computed at 
prescribed standard rates on a forty-hour week, fifty-two-week 
year basis, regardless of the actual employment of the individ-
ual military personnel involved . 
It is at this point that the planning for PRIME ignored 
or disregarded practical considerations which will bear on the 
effectiveness of PRIME as a management control device . The 
first, and most important difficulty in charging the costs of 
milit~ry personnel costs to the unit level as an element of 
expense is that , with virtually no exceptions, the unit com-
mander has no control whatsoever over the assignment of mili-
tary personnel to his unit . In the Navy, "The Bureau of Naval 
2Ibid . , p . 3 . 
3u. s . , Department of Defense, Instruction 7220 . 15, 
"Budgeting and Accounting for the Cost of Military Personnel 
Services," June 1, 1966, p . 1 . 
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Personnel shall be responsible for • • • the procurement and 
distribution of all personnel of the Navy • • • • establishing 
complements and allowances of personnel of the Navy for all 
activities of the Navy, ashore and afloat. • the prepara-
tion of estimates for funds necessary for the pay and allow-
ances of personnel of the Navy . "4 The Bureau of Naval 
Personnel (BUPERS ) is the central personnel manager for all 
of the Navy. Through an extensive automated system, BUPERS 
matches the inflow, outflow, and on-board count of naval 
personnel and distributes available personnel according to 
decision rules which are designed to serve the best interests 
of the whole Navy . Numbers and types of military personnel 
allowed to each unit are set or revised on an individual unit 
basis at the highest level of management in BUPERS and the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations after consideration 
of a number of factors, including complex staffing criteria 
and the missions and tasks assigned to the unit . Unit com-
manders can recommend, request, or comment to BUPERS, but can 
in no way control the number or quality of personnel assigned 
to their unit . 
A second major difficulty in charging military per-
sonnel costs to the operating unit is that promotions, which 
cause an increase to entitlements to pay, of all naval per-
sonnel except the lowest three pay grades are administered 
centrally for the whole Navy . The unit commander can demote 
4u.s . , Department of the Navy, u. s . Navy Regulations, 
1948, Art . 0440, p . 45 . 
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personnel for disciplinary reasons or withhold enlisted 
promotions for disciplinary or certain other disqualifying 
reasons, but cannot in any real sense control, or even 
anticipate the level of that element of military personnel 
pay costs . 
A third difficulty in the costing system prescribed 
by DOD Instruction 7220 . 15 is that costing is at standard 
rates . Over the Navy as a whole, the actual costs of all 
naval personnel should approximate the total computed from 
standard rates . But, since the standard rate for any pay 
grade is an average, there are personnel who are paid at 
rates above and below the standard, average rate . In any 
given unit, therefore, the unit commander may be charged 
amounts for military personnel costs which are at variance 
with the amounts actually applicable to the personnel assigned 
to his unit . 
The purposes of charging military personnel costs to 
the organizational unit level are, as previously indicated, 
to determine the full cost of operations of units for plan-
ning, programming, and budgeting purposes and to motivate 
managers . Although Dr . Anthony recently stated n ••• the 
system associates expenses with the managers responsible for 
incurring them •••• "5 (emphasis mine ) , PRIME clearly does 
not do so . The unit commander does not control the number or 
5Robert N. Anthony, 11 Some Problems in Communication, 11 
An Address to the Federal Government Accountant ' s Symposium, 
June 14, 1967. 
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types of military personnel provided to him nor, consequently, 
the cost of their services . Therefore it is difficult to 
accept the premise that he is responsible for incurring those 
costs . It is true that the commander is responsible for 
military personnel in the sense of being accountable for the 
effective use of the personnel provided to him, but it does 
not follow that he will be positively motivated to try to 
"manage" military personnel for fina.ncial reasons . In fact, 
since he has no authority to manage the inflow or outflow of 
personnel, this requirement of PRIME is without any substan-
tial utility as a device for motivation at the unit level . 
In addition, because of the complexity of the personnel dis-
tribution processes and the need to maintain the proper 
balance of personnel among all naval units, it is unlikely 
that the unit commander would ever have much flexibility in 
determining the allocation of military personnel . 
It would seem reasonable that if a manager is to be 
charged for, and his performance evaluated on costs, the 
manager should have some degree of control over the magnitude 
of the costs . In this respect, Myron J . Gordon lists as the 
first rule for the pricing of inputs that " • • • , they 
should reflect the authority that has been delegated to the 
manager . In other words, he should only be charged with costs 
over which he has control or administrative responsibility . "6 
6Myron J. Gordon, "The Use of Administered Price 
Systems to Control Large Organizations," Management Controls: 
New Directions in Basic Research, ed . Charles P. Bonini and 
others (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964) , p . 5. 
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It is obvious that since the commander has no control over 
military personnel costs in fact, this requirement of PRIME 
may act more as a nuisance than as a motivator toward more 
efficient ma.nagement at the operating level . Furthermore, 
the amount the unit commander will be charged for the use of 
his military personnel can, indeed must , vary from the amount 
truly incurred by those personnel . It will be difficult to 
convince the unit commander that since the standard rate will 
"average outn over the Navy as a whole, he should accept them 
as a meaningful measure of the costs for which he will be held 
responsible, especially the commanders of that half of the 
naval personnel who will actually earn less than the average 
rate but who will nevertheless be charged at the "full price" 
to the commander . The nuisance factor generated by PRIME will 
therefore be even more aggravated . 
One effect of making the unit commander financially 
responsible, hence more aware of military personnel costs may 
be to motivate the commander to review personnel requirements 
more actively and to request or recommend changes more fre-
quently . If the commander feels that the personnel distribu-
tion system is faulty, he may be encouraged more under PRIME 
to complain and point out the faults of the system. These 
minor benefits do not seem to be strong justification for the 
use of military personnel costs for management control pur-
poses . 
Military personnel costs can be computed for each 
organizational unit and program element for planni.ng, 
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programming, and budgeting purposes at the BUPERS level, using 
the existing personnel reporting systems and the same standard 
rates set by PRIME . The results of such a computation should 
not differ significantly from PRIME ' s results, provided that 
the personnel reporting systems are reasonably accurate . If 
they are not, it would appear to be more economical to improve 
the existing systems rather than install the wholly new, 
dupli8ating, overlapping system proposed by PRIME . 
The goal of PRIME to instill managerial motivation 
toward efficiency at the operating level will be achieved only 
nominally unless and until the entire military personnel 
management proceso is changed from top to bottom. Recommenda-
tions or requests for changes in personnel allowances, which 
are the only actions presently available to unit commanders , 
are not processed quickly enough to be of any short term 
management benefit . Until the operating commander has genuine 
freedom to act and to exercise some discretion in setting his 
military personnel levels, it would appear that the require-
ment of PRIME to charge military personnel costs to the 
operating level for management control purposes is not justi-
fied. The writer could find no indication that any change to 
increase the freedom of unit commanders to manage their per-
sonnel allowance is contemplated in the foreseeable future . 
It is the belief of the writer , therefore, that while this 
requirement of PRIME is conceptually sound , given the proper 
conditions, such conditions do not exist . PRIME is far too 
ambiticus in this requirement and should be tempered according 
to the existing military personnel management situation. 
Maintenance of Investment-Type Items . --The OSD defi-
nition of investment-type items includes 11major end items of 
equipment,"7 which includes complete aircraft, for instance, 
and "reparable assemblies, spares, and repair parts which are 
centrally managed recoverable items and which are designated 
reparable because unserviceable quantities are considered by 
the inventory manager in its requirements determination . "8 
This definition includes the majority of components, assem-
blies, and other replaceable aeronautical material and air-
borne electronic and ordnance devices required for the 
maintenance of naval aircraft . The OSD requirement that the 
"cost of maintenance, repair, overhaul, or rework of invest-
ment items is e.xpense"9 is logical and reasonable . But in 
attempting to carry this requirement to the operating level 
under the concept of full costing, PRIME has created some 
difficulties . 
Aviation maintenance in the Navy is conducted in 
three levels which are as follows: 
Organizational, which is the level of maintenance 
that the aviation squadron or unit can organically perform 
without assistance using only the limited amount of tools a.nd 
7non Instruction 7040 . 5, p . 3. 
8Ibid ., p . 4. 
9Ibid . , p . 3. 
59 
equipment that the squadron can carry with it as a mobile 
unit . The depth and nature of maintenance at the organiza-
tional level is relatively minor . 
Intermediate, which is performed in shops at the 
base level . Intermediate-level facilities serve the base, 
tenant, or transient squadrons and aircraft and perform a 
relatively heavy level of maintenance . Intermediate-level 
facilities are designed on the principle of "economy of 
scale," pooling limited amounts of relatively costly tools 
and test and support equipment and limited numbers of skilled 
aviation maintenance technicians in facilities at the scene 
of aircraft operations, the aviation base . 
Depot, which is the complete overhaul and repair 
of aeronautical material carried out on a centrally-managed 
and located basis for the whole Navy . 
The paramount objective of maintenance at the aviation 
unit level is to make aircraft ready for safe flight so as to 
carry out the ultimate mission of the unit: aircraft opera-
tions . Because of the limited amount of tools, equipment, and 
the relatively small number of skilled technicians available, 
the responsibility of the aviation unit for maintenance is 
generally restricted to light preventative maintenance and 
the trouble-shooting and removal and replacement of unservice-
able items . Items become unserviceable for a number of 
reasons, including material failure, "high time" (which is 
mandatory removal at some specified operating interval, 
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usually hours of operation, for complete overhaul ) , or 
mandatory removal and return to a higher maintenance level 
for incorporation of modifications directed by higher author-
ity. If the removed item cannot be returned to serviceable 
condition at the organizational level, the aviation unit 
exchanges it for a serviceable item which is installed on the 
aircraft to return it to ready status . The unserviceable 
item is either made serviceable at the intermediate-level 
facility serving the unit or returned to the designated over-
haul point (the depot-level maintenance facility ) for the 
required maintenance or modification action. 
Under the Navy system for management of aviation 
maintenance facilities, funds are applied at the level where 
the maintenance is actually performed and each level is 
responsible for, and manages, its resources so as to optimize 
its output of items returned to serviceable condition in 
relation to cost . In the case of the aviation unit, since 
the majority of maintenance actions are removal, exchange, 
and replacement of unserviceable items , no cost is charged 
directly to the aviation unit . Because the majority of 
aeronautical items are peculiar to one, or a very few, air-
craft types, and in turn aircraft types can be related to 
only one program element, maintenance costs can be identified 
to program element for planning, programming, and budgeting 
purposes . There are exceptions to this general proposition, 
but they are minor in relation to the total volume of 
maintenance actions and costs . 
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While the Navy system can satisfy the information 
needs for planning, programming, and budgeting, it does not 
conform to PRIME ' s goal of full costing at the operating 
level for management control purposes . To implement that 
goal, OSD directives are quite explicit in requiring that the 
cost of maintenance of investment-type items be charged as 
an expense at the aviation unit level . DOD Instruction 
7220 . 22 directs that "reparable assemblies, repair parts, and 
other items issued from stocks of investment items on an ex-
change basis • • • will be charged at exchange prices in 
accordance with [non Instruction 7220 . 19]"10 and further, in 
the case of items which are made serviceable at the inter-
mediate-level maintenance facility and returned to the 
aviation unit for reinstallation, "charges for services 
rendered by a service unit • • • will be at standard costs, 
or actual costs, whichever is more feasible . "11 DOD Instruc-
tion 7220 . 19 further details the procedure as follows: 
The cost of equipment maintenance performed at 
organizational and base/ installation levels will be 
charged directly as expense of the program element and 
using activity or unit at the time maintenance is per-
formed . Investmen~e recoverable components issued 
from supply to replace unserviceable components as re-
quired in the equipment maintenance process will be 
charged to the maintenance function on the following 
basis: 
1 . If the repair required is performed at base level, 
the charge will be determined at base level . 
10non Instruction 7220 . 22, p . 3. 
11Ibid . , p . 3. 
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2. If the repair required cannot be performed 
locally, then a standard price, hereafter 
referred to as the "standard repair price" will 
be used . 12 (Emphasis mine. ) 
This provision is the logical theoretical extension of 
the full costing concept . PRIME assumes that in having to pay 
the costs of maintenance of investment-type items the unit 
commander will be motivated to make "better" operating and 
maintenance decisions . PRIME assumes that the unit commander 
is somehow responsible for causing the maintenance action, 
hence he must pay the cost . This philosophy was expressed 
~earlier by Dr . Anthony in his Management Accounting, Text and 
Cases as follows : "This [the maintenance function] is partly 
the responsibility of the operating department foreman 
[analogous to the unit commander] who can influence the amount 
of required maintenance work by how well he takes care of his 
equipment . "l3 
Only in the extreme oases of abuse, neglect, or gross 
carelessness can a unit commander affect aviation maintenance 
by "how well he takes care of his equipment . " Taking care of 
his equipment, as previously stated, consists primarily of 
replacing unserviceable items so as to achieve his predomi-
nant objective of conducting flight operations . Maintenance 
actions performed at the unit level are explicitly prescribed 
12u. s . , Department of Defense, Instruction 7220 . 19, 
"Charges for Maintenance of Investment-Type Equipment," 
December 20, 1966, p . 1 . 
13Anthony, Management Accounting, Text and Cases, 
p. 362 . 
by higher authority with the specific intent of encouraging 
--motivating--the unit commander to manage his maintenance 
effort to the end of having 100 per cent of the unit ' s air-
craft ready for safe, mission-productive flight . Costs of 
maintenance, as such, are considered secondary to the over-
riding goal of achieving full mission readiness at the 
operating level . 
It is true that the present maintenance management 
system does not in itself encourage efficiency. In the 
interests of achieving maximum effectiveness units may 
perform more maintenance than is actually needed . Further, 
since the aviation unit is not given a cost charge for the 
exchange of investment-type aeronautical items, there is no 
direct motivation for the aviation units to actively investi-
gate unserviceable items to determine if they can be returned 
to service at the unit level . PRIME seeks to curb any unneces-
sary maintenance and to provide the motivation needed to 
encourage repair of unserviceable items at the lowest possible 
level . 
There is no conceptual conflict between PRIME ' s 
objective of efficiency and the present maintenance management 
system ' s objective of effectiveness . By stressing the measure-
ment of costs of the maintenance of investment-type items at 
the unit level, however, PRIME will create a wholly new main-
tenance management environment at the operating level . The 
tone of that environment will be set by the process described 
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as follows by Peter Drucker : "o ~ o the fact that this or 
that set of phenomena is being singled out for being 
tcontrolledl signals that it is being considered to be 
important ~ "l4 The rational unit commander would , therefore , 
seek to minimize his maintenance costs within sound mainte-
nance limits so as to present the best possible picture of 
efficiency to his superiors~ As long as the amount of funds 
available to the unit commander is sufficient to finance all 
required operations and maintenance , there will be no prob-
lems ~ But if funds are restricted, and they have been ~ 
~ occasions in the past ~ the commander must decide where 
to reduce his costs to remain within funding limitations . 
Flight operations are highly visible to, indeed directed by, 
the commander l s superiors . Maintenance , on the other hand , 
is visible in the short term only to the unit commander him-
self ~ The natural tendency of commanders who desire to 
satisfy their superiors in the short term will therefore be 
to continue to fly as directed but to forego as much mainte-
nance as is required to provide funds for flight operations . 
They will , in effect , trade almost invisible maintenance for 
highly visible flight operations . 
It is the contention of this writer that the require-
ment of PRIME to charge the costs of maintenance of investmen~ 
type items to the aviation unit contains more possible danger 
14peter F . Drucker, "Controls , Control , and Manage -
ment," Mana ement Controls: New Directions in Basic Research, 
ed . Char es P. Bonini and others New York : McGraw-Hi 1 Book 
Company, 1964) , p . 288 . 
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than good, especially if funds are restricted . And funds are 
now severely restricted because of the armed hostilities in 
Southeast Asia and promise to remain restricted for a long 
time to come . This requirement of PRIME is conceptually 
sound given the proper funding condit mans, but the realities 
of the present-day situation inject a genuine danger . While 
it is, of course, highly desirable to promote efficiency in 
the aviation maintenance process, it is far more desirable to 
insure that required maintenance of Navy aircraft is actually 
carried out . It is in the best interests of the Navy and the 
U. s . taxpayer that the multi-billion-dollar investment in 
aircraft is protected by proper maintenance on time, every 
time it is required . Any maintenance short of that mark will 
endanger not only combat readiness and the defense posture of 
the nation but also the safety of flight . And in the words 
of a senior naval aviator, Captain Robert H. Conn, U. S. N. , 
"We don ' t want to put the Navy in a position where we jeopard-
ize safety for dollars . "l5 The possibility of motivation to 
make the maintenance schedule conform to funding constraints 
is not remote . In fact, by exposing costs as the central 
value to be optimized, such motivation will surely follow, 
exactly as PRIME ' s planners intend . It is suggested that in 
view of the present dangers involved, this requirement of 
PRIME should be held in abeyance until more normal funding 
and operating conditions prevail . 
l5conn . 
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In addition to the harmful motivational consequences 
discussed above, PRIME will produce distortions to the 
measurement of true, accurate costs at the operating level . 
Budgeting will be weakened accordingly, and the use of cost 
information for control purposes made correspondingly more 
difficult . The problems of this situation are presented suc-
cinctly in the following extract from a Navy memorandum on 
the subject : 
Aircraft overhaul requirements are based on a time 
factor (months between overhaul}, while engine over-
hauls are prescribed based on operating hours . Thus a 
squadron commander cannot exercise any real control over 
the use of overhaul funds . The squadron commander has 
no control over the assignment of aircraft to his squad-
ron . Thus one squadron may be assigned aircraft which 
are near the end of their service tour or which have 
high-time engines which will necessitate that particular 
squadron to finance aircraft or engine exchanges even 
though the squadron did not, in reality, consume the 
resources . Conversely, a squadron might be equipped 
with new aircraft and low-time engines and would have 
few overhaul requirements . Costs accumulated at the 
user level under these circumstances are not meaningful 
for control purposes 9r for the purpose of measuring 
squadron efficiency . lb 
Costs gathered under PRIME, therefore, will not be 
suitable for management control purposes at the operating 
level unless accompanied by extensive footnotes or adjusted 
to mitigate the effects of the distortions to the true costs 
of resources consumed by each unit which PRIME will cause . 
And what additional motivation might accrue in the situation 
described above? The unit commander can be expected to do 
16Memorandum from G. W. Sjogren to L. w. Carlson and 
others, Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller of 
the Navy, Memorandum NCFS 352 7300/ 1, Washington, D. c. , 
November 21, 1967. 
little more than complain about: 
1 . Having to pay for the maintenance of items 
which his unit did not use for a length of time which the 
commander perceives to be equitable . 
2. Having to pay a price which he believes to 
be too high for items maintained by other organizations. 
3. PRIME . And since PRIME is the "decision 
which has been made," this last possibility is futile . The 
first two possibilities may bring about some changes to the 
aircraft assignment practices or promote some efficiency in 
maintenance practices at higher maintenance levels . In any 
case, this requirement of PRIME will generate some dissatis-
faction, constructive or otherwise, at the operating level . 
Evaluation of the benefits and sacrifices involved in 
the application of investment-type items at the operating 
level for management control purposes would seem to indicate 
that PRIME needs further refinement at this time . PRIME ' s 
planners considered purely theoretical matters only and 
ignored or overlooked the real situation which now exists in 
the aviation maintenance management system. This requirement 
of PRIME, therefore, should be held in abeyance until a more 
stable financial environment returns to the DOD and until 
provision to recognize the possible distortion of the measure-
ment of the true costs of resources consumed is built into 
the system. It is understood informally by the writer that 
OSD is considering just such a waiver of this requirement. 
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Modification of Investment-TYpe Items . --The require-
ments of PRIME concerning the cost of modification of 
investment-type items is not directly related to the full 
costing concept . Because the nature of the problem is closely 
associated with the material just presented it is discussed 
at this point in the study to preserve continuity. DOD In-
struction 7040 . 5 defines modification as 11 • • • the altera-
tion, conversion or modification of [investment-type item~ 
which changes or improves the basic character, purpose or 
operational capacity in relation to effectiveness, efficiency 
or safety . "l7 Modifications of aeronautical items can be 
classed in two general categories : those which involve the 
safety of flight or are of such urgent operational importance 
as to require immediate installation, and those which may be 
deferred to some later time . The OSD directives regulating 
the costing of modifications to investment-type items will be 
examined in this context . 
DOD Instruction 7040 . 5 directs that the costs of 
modification performed at the organizational or intermediate 
levels be charged as expenses , to Operations and Maintenance 
appropriations . At the depot level, however, modification 
costs may be charged as investments to Procurement appropria-
tions . l8 The reasons for this arbitrary differentiation 
between expenses and investments purely on the basis of the 
l7non Instruction 7040. 5, p . 5 . 
18 Ibid . , pp . 2, 5 . 
level of maintenance at which the modification is performed 
is unknown . It is surmised that the basic reason is f or 
expediency, alone . The organizational and intermediate levels 
of maintenance are rarely, if ever, recipients of Procurement 
funds, and it is naturally more expedient to require t hose 
levels to charge modifications to expense rather than have 
to pr ovide Procurement funds to those levels . 
Yielding to expedtency in this case may be practical, 
but it must be recognized that it introduces distortion to the 
true nature of the costs collected by PRIME . The nature of 
modification costs is the same, regardless of the level at 
which the modification is performed . PRIME would ignore this 
fact and report modification costs in both of the "mutually 
exclusive"l9 categories . The validity of cost information so 
gathered by PRIME would be lessened accordingly . 
The requirement that modification costs be borne as 
expenses at the organizational and intermediate level also 
carries with it a message : Do not perform any more modifica-
tions than are absolutely necessary . Knowing that modifica-
tions must be charged as expense, the lower two levels will 
be motivated to perform only the modifications \<Jhich require 
immediate installation. Those levels will be encouraged to 
defer indefinitely those modifications which can be deferred, 
until the aeronautical items concerned are ultimately returned 
to the depot level for complete overhaul . This fault of PRIME 
19Ibid . , p . 2 . 
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is to some extent true under existing procedures . But, 
coupled with the requirement of PRIME that the unit must pay 
a standard maintenance cost for the exchange of unserviceable 
for serviceable items, the motivation to forego modifications 
will be strengthened . Why pay to modify items on hand when 
they can be ultimately exchanged for items which will have 
the modification installed, at no extra cost? There is no 
easy solution to this problem within or without the framework 
of PRIME except for application of more stringent nonmonetary 
constraints in the maintenance management systems . 
Another unusual rule set by PRIME is that 
When modification and maintenance are done concur -
rently at depot level , the total effort will be invest-
ment when the costs for modification, including the 
cost of investment items of equipment to be installed, 
are greater than the costs to perform the required 
maintenance exclusive of any modification . Otherwise , 
maintenance performed at depot level is an expe.nse . 20 
If the maintenance of investment- type items is truly 
an expense , why should it be transformed into an investment 
because it happened to be performed coincident with modifica-
tion? Is not the true nature of maintenance costs the same 
regardless of concurrence with modification costs? It is 
suggested that PRIME would better serve its purposes by 
eliminating the two arbitrary conditional rules discussed 
above and adhering to its basic rules: the costs of mainte-
nance are expense and the costs of modification are investment . 
Neither of the preceding problems concerning 
20rb·d h 
__ 1._., p . ::;> . 
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modification costs are of such magnitude as to cause alarm. 
It is necessary to point out these arbitrary features, however, 
to show that PRIME is not always based on consistent applica-
tion of concepts and further that PRIME will not provide the 
completely reliable , accurate cost information promised by 
its proponents. The real significance of these features is 
that PRIME is expedient at the expense of accuracy whenever 
PRIME ' s planners deem it prudent . 
A Summary of Full Costing. --The application of the 
full costing concept to DOD accounting systems by PRIME in-
volves many more requirements than are presented in this 
study. The situations cited are illustrative of the manner 
in which PRIME applies the full costing concept and present 
the major problems which the writer believes to be facing 
PRIME at this time . As has been shown, those problems are of 
significance to the success or failure of PRIME and apparently 
have not been given adequate consideration . 
Since PRIME can be expedient where it chooses to be, 
the inference is strong that PRIME could have been more selec-
tive in applying the full costing concept had its planners 
recognized the need to be selective . While the full costing 
concept is fundamentally sound, PR~ME has not given adequate 
regard to the conditions which exist in reality at this time 
in the Defense establishment . 
A more restrained, gradual infusion of the full cost-
ing concept, tailored to give more recognition to the situa-
tions discussed in this study would have been a more desirable 
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approach ~ The ultimate arbiter of Federal Government account-
ing systems, the GAO, provides the following guidelines on 
cost accounting which adequately describe some considerations 
to which PRIME ' s planners might have given more attention: 
Cost data provided for management and congressional 
use must be reasonably accurate to be of valid use in 
making evaluations or decisions . At the same time, 
unnecessary precision and refinement of such data should 
be avoided . ---
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Proper evaluations of cost of performance by areas of 
responsibility can be made only with respect to costs that 
are controllable by the person being held accountable . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Cost-finding techniques involve the production of 
cost data by analytical or sampling methods • • • • 
Because of the complexity of some Government operations, 
it is sometimes just as satisfactory, as well as more 
economical, to us~ cost-finding techniques to produce 
cost data •••• 1 (Emphasis mine .) 
Integration of Programming, Budgeting, and Accounting 
One goal of PRIME is to " • • • close the programming-
budgeting-accounting-management loop,"22 by thoroughly inte-
grating each segment of that loop. Much of that goal has been 
achieved procedurally by revising the program elements and 
introducing the responsibility center and cost building block 
concepts . The accounting systems, organizational structures, 
and program structure now conform to one another . Supporting 
22non, "A Primer on Project PRIME," p . 29 . 
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those changes are the standardization of expense and invest-
ment cost definitions and collection procedures. But PRIME 
is not content with the degree of integration that the pro-
cedural changes will provide . 
The thinking of PRIME ' s planners is that the budget 
and the appropriation structure also should be restructured 
to conform to the DOD program structure . PRIME would merge 
the two appropriations Operations and Maintenance and Military 
Personnel into one supra-appropriation, "Operations . " Further, 
the budget would be changed, as stated by Secretary McNamara, 
to 11 • a form that summarizes proposed operating expenses 
by major organizational entities and programs . "23 This 
approach to budgeting is opposed to the present organization/ 
appropriation/budget activity structure of the present budget 
which is supported £l program analyses . The assumptions which 
motivate PRIME ' s planners to propose these changes are that 
without total conformity of all systems to the program 
structure, there will be 11 • • • no assurance that the plans 
will be actually turned into actions,"24 and that othel"wise, 
II there is, at best, only an indirect way of actually • • • 
tracking performance against pla.ns . u25 
The Congress is not receptive to this line of thinkin~ 
as evidenced by the following statement of the House Committee 
on Appropriations: 
23McNamara to Mahon . 
24DOD, "A Primer on Project PRIME, 11 p . 28 . 
25Ibid . 
There are a number of pitfalls that can be foreseen 
with respect to the proposed system, not the least of 
which is the inflexibility of the program structure which 
would necessarily follow . At present the program struc-
ture, being independent of the budgeting and accounting 
system, can be altered or redirected as circumstance or 
prudent management appears to require . Once such a pro-
gram system becomes legislative history in support of 
an appropriation act it can be cbanged only by some 
further legislative expression . 26 
Not only does the Congress oppose the change, such 
change does not appear to even be necessary . David Novick, 
one of the earliest proponents of program budgeting in the 
Federal Government, explains that : 
It is , of course , a virtue of [program budgeting] 
••• that it does not require a change in budget format . 
Planning and programming are simply superimposed on the 
budget and govern its substance, although not its form . 27 
And in further substantiation of the opposition to PRIME, 
Charles J. Hitch, former Assistant Secretary of Defense 
( Comptroller ) and chief architect of DOD ' s planning, program-
ming, and budgeting system, the prototype for all of the 
Federal Government, is equally explicit: 
• • • the existing budget structure serves some very 
useful purposes • • • • Although military planning and 
the formulation of programs should logically be done in 
terms of missions and forces , the Department must be 
managed not only in those terms but also in terms of 
resources •••• division of the budget by broad input 
category or resource categories also provides needed 
flexibility for the adjustments in the program that are 
inevitably required in the course of the budget year . 
26House Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropria-
tions Bill, 1968, pp. 6-7 . 
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• • • It is impoBtant not to freeze programs in appro-
priation OI11s . 2 (Emphasis-mine .) 
The remarks quoted above as to the unnecessary nature 
of PRIME ' s proposal to structure the DOD appropriations, hence 
the budget, on programs needs no elaboration by the writer . 
It may be of interest to speculate further into the reason, 
other than those officially stated, for the reaction of the 
Congress . The proposed change in budget format would greatly 
affect the way in which the Congress reviews and enacts appro-
priations . The Committees on Appropriations of both houses 
of the Congress are composed of members who have many, many 
years of individual and collective experience in analyzing 
DOD appropriation requests . It is natural to expect that they 
would oppose a change which would render their expertise rela-
tively useless . The change would force them to rely on OSD 
analyses until the individual members could reacquire the 
analytical skills necessary to review the DOD appropriation 
requests in the new format . The Congress has been openly 
reluctant to rely on OSD analyses in the past; they can hardly 
be expected to acquiesce to even temporary reliance on OSD in 
the future . Former Defense Comptroller Hitch recognized this 
fact and the preeminence of the Congress in budgetary matters,29 
along with the other shortcomings of structuring the budget 
28charles J . Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles , California: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1965 ) , pp . 29-30. 
29Ibid . 
in p~ograrn terms . PRIME ' s planners, however, either ignored 
or discounted the importance of the attitudes of the Congress 
and in so doing aroused Congressional opposition to the degree 
that may be the most significant reason that the Congress 
prohibited implementation of RMS/ PRIME . 
To satisfy the Congress, present OSD plans state that 
the budget and appropriation structures will continue to be 
submitted to the Congress in the pre-PRIME form . At the 
military department level, however , the appropriations en-
acted by the Congress will be combined and converted to 
single operating budgets within the program structure which 
will flow downward through the organization . Accounting at 
the operating levels will be for the single operating budgets , 
but reports flowing upward in the organization will be recon-
verted to appropriation structure at the military department 
level . It would appear, therefore, that despite the merits 
or demerits of changing the budget or appropriation structures, 
total integration of programming, budgeting, and accounting 
may be accomplished . 
Decentralized Decision Making 
Decentralization of decision making, repeatedly 
stressed in the unofficial literature of PRIME, remains 
largely a concept at this time . Except for superficial in-
creases in flexibility at the operating level , nonmonetary 
resource constraints that existed before PRIME are still in 
force . In particular, military personnel allocation decisions 
are still centrally made . And since military personnel costs 
7'7 
are fully one-half of the total operating costs of the DOD, 
meaningful flexibility at the operating level promises to 
remain an ideal . 
Decentralization of decision making in organizations 
is a subject worthy of its own study . It must be pointed out 
that successful decentralization depends more on the skill 
and competence of the managers involved than on any particular 
management control system. PRIME would thrust the role of 
"manager" on many Defense commanders who are neither accus-
tomed to thinking in terms of resource management nor schooled 
in management disciplines . Until Defense commanders become 
managers in fact , as well as by decree , through training, 
education, and experience, it is just as wel l that decentral-
ization of decision making be approached with care in the DOD . 
It is probably in recognition of this situation that OSD has 
not to date directed any specific decentralization as such . 
Output Measurement 
Although RMS/ PRIME stresses the measurement of outputs 
as a necessity for successful management , specific, official 
guidance concerning output measurement has not yet been pro-
mulgated by OSD . While the planning for and the implementa-
tion of the elements of PRIME dealing with measurement of 
inputs has moved at a rapid pace , output; measurement has been 
relegated to a position of lesser importance . Evaluation of 
performance--output- -of military units in the existing DOD 
systems generally consists of intermediate commanders ' 
subjective appraisals of the effectiveness of their subordi-
nates . A few restrictive quantitative measures such as air-
craft flight hours and ship steaming hours provide some 
limited assistance in the appraisal process . Those measures 
are quite useful for incremental budgeting and financial 
management purposes but do not provide sufficient description 
of the true nature of output to be useful in a broad manager-
ial sense . Apart from the management systems as such, 
"readiness" indices provide operational commanders, primarily 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with current statu~ in relation to 
ability to perform assigned missions and tasks . Readiness 
indices, too, in their present form, do not provide a meaning-
ful indicator of the output of military units . 
In response to a memorandum from Secretary McNamara 
dated March 3, 1967, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp-
troller ) Anthony commissioned a joint study group on May 12, 
1967, to examine the output measurement problem. The princi-
ples set forth by Dr . Anthony to guide the study group are 
quoted in part as follows : 
Output is defined as either (a ) actual execution of 
an assigned mission or function or, (b ) the capability 
of performing those missions and functions for which 
officially configured . 
• • • the information must reflect not only output as 
of a given time, but also significant changes in output . 
Output should be measured quantitatively, and 
preferably on a continuum. 
The information must be derived by auditable means . 
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The measurement of output should be relatable to 
measures of input, that is, to resources consumed . 30 
Following the work of the joint study group , OSD 
established the "Directorate for Output Measurement Systems" 
under the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Management 
Systems Development ) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Comptroller). The Directorate of Output Measure-
ment Systems is charged with the task to " ••• develop , 
design, and implement systematic methods and procedures to 
measure and report output •• • of DOD organizations . "31 
The rationale upon which the Directorate of Output 
Measurement Systems bases the planning now in progress is 
that Defense managers can 11 • • • establish unique correla-
tions, i . e . , to determine what specific changes in performance 
~ be expected as ~ result of a given change in resources 
available,"32 and that relationships so established can be 
used as the basis for resource allocation decisions . The 
Directorate defines output as "actual performance , plus capa-
bility of performance • • • ,"and "output measuren as "a use-
ful descriptor of operational functions performed , measured 
30u. s. , Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller ) , Memorandum for Secretaries 
of the Military Departments , Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Subject : "Improved Ways of Measuring Outputs," 
Washington, D. c. , May 12, 1967, Encl . , p . 2. 
31u.s. , Department of Defense , Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller ) , Management Systems Develop-
ment, "Output Measurement Systems , Development Plan," 
Washington , D. c. , October 4, 1967, p . 3-1 . 
32 4 Ibid . , p . -2 . 
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in relation to functions assigned, and of capabilities 
possessed, measured in relation to capabilities required . "33 
Capabilities are to be measured in terms of readiness, which 
is defined as "the capability of an organization, weapon 
system or equipment to perform the missions or functions for 
which it is organized or designed . "34 
Because output measurement in the DOD is still in the 
early, theoretical stages of development and the principles 
and definitions quoted above are only tentative, objectivity 
demands that appraisal in depth await promulgation by OSD of 
firm guidelines and directives . The assumptions and rationale 
which support OSD planning, however, deserve study . Two 
points in particular must be examined . First, can the output 
of military units be measured by a quantified index as en-
visioned by ASD (C) ? Second , is there a stable , determinable 
relationship between the inputs and the outputs of military 
units? 
Concerning measurements for control purposes, Peter 
Drucker states that measurement " • • • must present the 
events measured in structurally true form . "35 Neither per-
formance nor readiness , alone, adequately describes all of 
what a military unit does or is ready to do . Roland N. 
McKean, co-author with former Defense Comptroller Hitch of 
33Ibid., App . A, p . A-1 . 
34Ibid . , p . A-2 . 
35nrucker, p . 289 . 
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the acclaimed The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age36 
explains the problems of output, effectiveness, measurement 
as follows : 
The basic difficulty is that of generating unique, 
simple , helpful measures of effectiveness . First, for 
numerous weapon systems and program elements, there are 
no satisfactory metrics of effectiveness . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Many program elements yield multiple and incommensurable 
achievements •••• The achievements cannot be made com-
mensurable by putting them in terms of a common denomina-
tor . To show an indicator of one achievement and omit 
the others could be highly misleading. To show indicators 
of all such achievements could generate a clumsy budgetary 
exhibit that would be very costly in use . 37 
The problems exposed by McKean are formidable and 
would appear to make output measurement an impossible task . 
Indeed, some authorities state that the task is impossible. 
OSD should not be deterred from seeking to develop more mean-
ingful output measures, but must never lose sight of the 
understanding that such measures will probably never truly 
describe all that should be known about the effectiveness of 
military units . The seasoned judgment of military commanders 
will always be required to complement quantified output 
indices in the decision-making process . 
The relationships between resources consumed or 
available for use and performance or readiness are complex 
36charles J . Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics 
of Defense in the Nuclear Age {Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1960}. 
37Roland N. McKean, "Remaining Difficulties in Program 
Budgeting," Defense Management, ed . Stephen Enke {Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc . , 1967) , p . 68 . 
and dynamic through the time dimension and defy abstraction 
into simple models . Independent variables which would affect 
the output function in such a model would include such factors 
as the age and condition of equipment (aircraft, ship, weapons, 
etc .) available to each military unit, the state of training 
and the experience of personnel, training/operating schedules, 
geographical location, the imponderable matter of morale, and 
the like . A correlation between resources consumed or avail-
able for use and output no doubt exists in almost every case, 
but it is unigue to every case . Consider the following 
example, which is applicable to attack aircraft carriers 
{CVA ' s ) in the pre-Viet Nam environment: 
CVA 1 s are individually configured with electronic 
equipment, machinery, etc . , and may bear no more than a 
physical similarity to other CVA ' s, even those of their own 
"class . " CVA ' s go through a cycle beginning with intensive 
training following periodic overhaul, followed by operations 
and re-training and more operations, and ending with return 
to overhaul . Time between overhauls is several years . Costs 
during overhaul are at the highest of any time during the 
cycle, while performance and readiness are nil . Costs are 
relatively high and performance and readiness generally in-
creasing during the training phase of the cycle . During 
operations, costs are generally confined to normal daily 
operating and maintenance costs and are consequently rela-
tively low, and performance and training are at their peak . 
At any point in time there are CVA ' s in each phase of the 
cycle . Comparison of inputs and outputs among CVA ' s must, 
therefore, cover a number of years and take into account the 
individual differences of each CVA involved . While this 
example is the extreme because of the comparative size of the 
CVA, it is true of every vessel in the Navy, and similar prob-
lems are true of any mobile operating unit, including aircraft 
squadrona . 
Valid decision making under such circumstances 
requires a great volume of non-quantitative supporting infor-
mation . Since one policy of RMS is that 11 • • • data at each 
management level will consist of summaries of data used at 
lower levels,"38 the danger exists that in the summarization 
and filtration of information as it flows upward in the De-
fense establishment, the detailed information needed to 
properly explain all input/output relationships will be lost. 
The principles set forth by ASD (c ) to guide the 
development of output measures include the following: 11 The 
Secretary of Defense needs information on output in order to 
manage the allocation of resources, plan the future defense 
posture and resource requirements, evaluate the current status 
of the establishment, and be made aware of the areas where 
corrective action is needed . u39 (Emphasis mine .) This emphasis 
on tailoring the output measures for the use of the Secretary 
38DOD Instruction 7000.1, p. 4. 
39Memorandum, "Improved Ways of Measuring Outputs," 
Encl ., p. 2. 
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of Defense strongly implies that OSD should build single, 
quantified indices of output and simple input/output models 
since the Secretary does not have the time to spare to ana-
lyze great quantities of detailed data . While decision-making 
on a broad, program or weapons system basis using simple 
models and single output indices at the OSD level is probably 
feasible, detailed decision-making applicable to individual, 
lower-level organizational units clearly is not . The broad 
guidelines promulgated by ASD (C ) , therefore, can only be 
considered as applicable to decisions and analyses at the OSD 
level . 
Accrual Accounting 
DOD Instruction 7220.22 directs that "the accrual 
basis of accounting will be used 1140 in all accounting systems 
for operations . OSD ' s goal is not only to gain better finan-
cial information concerning past operating expenses, but also 
to afford managers better control of expenses (versus obliga-
tions ) while operations are underway . While this change is 
conceptually large, in practice it has been relatively easy 
to implement in the Navy. The Navy utilized stock funds and 
industrial funds extensively before PRIME and has increased 
use of those devices as a result of PRIME . The majority of 
naval operating units subsist on a day-to-day basis from 
either or both of those funds . Since obligation and expense 
are recorded simultaneously under that circumstance, reported 
operating costs more appropriately describe true period costs 
40DOD Instruction 7220 . 22. 
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of operations . The Navy has developed full accrual accounting 
procedures which are ready to be employed when, or if , the 
Congress grants permission to OSD to implement PRIME . Accrual 
accounting, however, is bound closely with the administrative 
control of operating funds , which has created some problems 
that will be discussed in the following paragraphs . 
Administrative Control of eperating Funds 
The Anti- Deficiency Statute , R. s . 3679, directs in 
part that "no officer or employee of the United States shall 
make or authorize an expenditure from or create or authorize 
an obligation under any appropriation or fund in excess of the 
amount available therein,"4l and provides severe penalties for 
violators . R. S. 3679 allows administrative division and sub-
division of appropriations by agencies as long as accountabil-
ity for compliance with the basic provision of the law is 
maintained and responsibility for non-compliance can be fixed 
on an individual . The military departments currently subdivide 
the Operations and Maintenance appropriations by means of 
"allotments," which carry R. S. 3679 sanctions, to the lowest 
organizational entities which have major accounting capabili-
ties . To insure compliance with R. S . 3679, military account-
ing systems account primarily for obligations l~ithin the 
appropriation structure enacted by the Congress . Since mili-
tary personnel are controlled centrally, Military Personnel 
4lu. s . , Department of the Navy , Financial Management 
in the Navy, NAVPERS 10792-B(INT), 1966 , App . A, quoting 31 
~u-. s~. c~.~6~6~5~,~ Revised Statute 3679, par . ( a ). 
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appropriations are accounted for centrally and no division 
subject to R. S . 3679 is made . 
PRIME ' s attempts to redefine the administrative con-
trol oi' funds has followed a tortuous path and is not yet 
resolved . The original intention of PRIME to change the 
process involved the following : 
1 . Shift to accrual accounting for expenses 
within program structure, instead of obligation accounting 
within appropriation and budget activity structure . 
2. Merger of the Operations and Maintenance and 
Military Personnel appropriations . 
3. Issuance of single operating budgets to 
organizational units which would cover both operating and 
military personnel costs and which would carry R. S. 3679 
sanctions for the operating budget total . 
Under PRIME ' s concept, the user of resources would be 
accountable , but would also have some flexibility in the allo-
cation of resources between military personnel and other costs . 
PRIME ' s concept was entirely dependent upon agreement of the 
Congress to revise the budget and appropriation structures to 
conform to the program elements and to merge the two operating 
appropriations . And this the Congress did not do . OSD, 
nevertheless, had an alternate plan which ASD {C ) promulgated 
on October 5, 1967. 42 The principal feature of the plan was 
42u. s . , Department of Defense, Ofr"ice of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense {Comptroller ) , Memorandum, Subject: 
"Administrative Control of Operating Budgets , " Washington, 
D. c. , October 5, 1967. 
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that military departments would be prohibited from making 
administrative divisions of appropriations subject to R. S. 
3679 . Instead, R. S. 3679 sanctions would stop at the military 
department level . Organizational units would be issued a 
single operating budget covering operating and military per-
sonnel costs "subject to Secretary of Defense administrative 
control . "43 
This plan could be viewed as abrogating, or weakening 
at best, the prerogatives of the Congress to regulate the 
administration of appropriated funds , as expressed in R. S. 
3679 . The intent of the law is to definitely fix responsibil-
ity on specific individuals for overobligation or overexpendi-
ture of funds appropriated by the Congress . R. S. 3679 respon-
sibilities would stop at the Secretary of the military depart-
ment level under. PRIME ' s alternate plan and it is unreasonable 
to expect that the Secretaries could be held personally 
accountable for the actions of the tens of thousands of mili-
tary and civilian personnel involved in the administration of 
appropriated funds all over the surface of the earth . This 
plan, therefore, did not remain in effect for long. After 
discussions in early November among representatives of all 
agencies involved, ASD ( C) promulgated yet another plan. 
The latest plan provides that a single operating 




will be issued by OSD to the military departments . 44 That 
portion of the operating budget applicable to Operations and 
Maintenance appropriations will be subject to R. S. 3679. 
Separate obligational authority for Military Personnel appro-
priations costs will be issued, subject to R. S. 3679, as 
presently done . R. S. 3679 responsibilities for Military Per-
sonnel funds will continue to reside at the military department 
level . Military departments may subsequently issue single 
operating budgets , again including both operating and military 
personnel costs, to subordinate organizational units with 
R. S. 3679 sanctions attached to the portion of the operating 
budget applicable to Operations and Maintenance funds . But, 
at the operating level, "the amount subject to R. S. 3679 
[that portion applicable to Operations and Maintenance funds] 
will be automatically and concurrently reduced in the amount, 
if a.ny, by which expenses for military personnel are incurred 
in excess of the amount specified for military personnel 
within the total operating budget . 11 45 (Emphasis mine .) 
While the latest plan may be acceptable to the Congress 
in terms of R. S. 3679, the relationship it establishes between 
Operations and Maintenance and Military Personnel appropria-
tions at the operating level, the automatic and concurrent 
reduction of operating funds if military personnel costs 
44u.s., Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (eomptroller ) , Memorandum, Subject : 
"Administrative Control of Operating Budgets," Washington, 
D. c. , November 22, 1967. 
45rb1d . , Encl . , p . 3. 
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exceed the budgeted amount, introduces a completely new and 
astounding concept to the administrative control of operating 
funds . As pointed out previously, military personnel alloca-
tions and promotions are controlled centrally . The unit com-
mander cannot in any sense of the word exercise even nominal 
control over his military personnel costs . But the latest 
plan completely ignores this fact and quite literally leaves 
the operating conunander 11holding the bag" by making him sub-
ject to prosecution for violations of R. S. 3679 which he is 
completely powerless to prevent . Even the very best financial 
manager can become a violator because of unexpected personnel 
receipts or promotions . The only recourse for all operating 
commanders , therefore , is to hold back reserves of operating 
funds to cover such an event . Since operating funds are 
annual funds , any such reserves remaining at the end of each 
fiscal year lapse for use , by law, and are lost forever to the 
operating unit and the DOD . In any case, the concept of 
"reserves" at the operating level is noxious since one of the 
precepts of OSD resource allocation is that firm requirements, 
only, are funded . A reserve at the operating level, therefore, 
would imply that something in the plans would have to go un-
funded until very late in the fiscal year, at best . The prob-
lem is compounded because if military personnel costs are 
below the budget , no automatic and concurrent increase to 
operating funds is allowed . The total amount of the thousands 





During deliberations preceding promulgation of the 
latest plan, the Deputy Comptroller of the Navy offered to 
ASD (C) the following comments: 
Perhaps of greater importance than the unprofitable 
creation of reserves is the psychological impact of this 
reducibility procedure upon the local commander who has 
been looking forward to RMS as a valuable management 
tool . I anticipate that this procedure , if implemented, 
will have a tendency to undermine the substantial time 
and effort invested by the Navy Department in educating 
and convincing managers of the merits of RMS . In effect, 
it applies greater constraints on the manager in 3679 
terms than exist today and the reaction cannot be expected 
to be anything other than adverse . The adverse reaction 
is heightened by the realization that in a converse situ-
ation (when military personnel numbers are reduced ) the 
O&M [Operations and Maintenance) availability is not 
automatically increased . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The Navy is unequivocally opposed to the concept 
that military personnel obligations be related to obli-
gations under the O&M,N appropriations for determination 
of violations of Section 3679.46 
Despite the serious shortcomings of the latest plan 
and the strong opposition of the Navy pointed out by the above 
comments, the plan was promulgated on November 22, 1967, for 
additional comments from the military departments . ASD {C ) 
did state that "we are considering various methods, . . • to 
minimize the impact on operation and maintenance availability 
within operating budgets of unanticipated movements of mili-
tary personnel . "47 But such methods, at best, will provide 
46Memorandum from the Deputy Comptroller of the Navy 
to the Assistant Secretary of Defense {Comptroller ) , Memo-
randum NCFS, Washington, D. c. , November 17, 1967 . 
47AsD (C) Memorandum, "Administrative Control of 
Operating Budgets," November 22, 1967. 
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only a. cure for the symptoms of the problem, not the 
problem itself . 
The November 22, 1967, plan_bears little conceptual 
resemblance to the original plan. The fundamental prereq-
uisites to the original plan were refused by the Congress so 
any plan must necessarily be based on other concepts . One 
cannot help but arrive at the feeling that OSD is not con-
cerned with concepts but is determined to change something 
--anything- -for the sake of change . The latest plan smacks 
of being merely a device contrived to permit a change , regard-
less of the merit of the change . The problem, repeatedly 
pointed out by this study, is that the present military per-
sonnel distribution system is not compatible with the plans 
of OSD. Monetary constraints imposed by OSD can only create 
hardships on operating commanders . The same problem existed 
in the original OSD plan. It must be concluded, therefore , 
that the OSD planning for change to the administrative con-
trol of operating funds is unrealistic and in basic error by 
not recognizing the existing nonmonetary personnel management 
system. 
Summary , Conceptual Changes 
The conceptual changes of PRIME are the keys to the 
management control system which PRIME seeks to establish in 
the DOD . Taken singly, or as a group, the conceptual changes 
are generally reasonable and sound . Under appropriate cir-
cumstances , each concept will no doubt contribute to improved 
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management control . It must be noted , however, that the 
concepts discussed in this chapter are all highly inter-
dependent, each bearing on the outcome of the others to some 
degree . 
Two concepts, full costing and the revised adminis-
trative control of operating funds, are applied without 
adequate recognition of the difficulties which they will 
encounter in practice . The debatable concept of revision 
of the budget and appropriation structures to conform to 
program structure has been skirted . The vital concept of 
output measurement has lagged in practical development and 
the planning that is taking place is almost exclusively 
oriented toward the needs of the Secretary of Defense . While 
that is at least a beginning toward guidance to the operating 
managers who must actually make PRIME work, this writer 
believes that more positive action should have been taken at 
the beginning of the planning for PRIME, not at the end . In 
summary, this writer must conclude that PRIME has been 
planned on a purely conceptual level and has not given ade-
quate weight to the practical matters which will bear on the 
ultimate success or failure of PRIME . 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The basic q'.leBtion raised by this study is "Can PRIME 
achieve the improvements to military resource management 
which are claimed by its planners?" The answer to that 
question is neither easy to determine nor ~an it be a simple 
yes or no . As pointed out in this study, PRIME is a melange 
of loosely integrated systems and procedures drawn from 
Federal law, commercial practices , and theory and is promul-
gated in a variety of forms and styles of directives . As 
such, it is even difficult to exactly define just what PRIME 
is . Many of the provisions of PRIME are common- sense , real-
istic changes and improvements that will do much to satisfy 
the law and to establish a more effective resource managament 
environment . Much more of PRIME, unfortunately, is not 
practically workable at the present time and the net effect 
of PRIME will not be as promised by PRIME ' s planners . If 
pressed for a single answer, the writer believes that this 
study shows that PRIME will not represent an overall improve-
ment to military resource management . 
PRIME will indeed generate more reliable and meaning-
ful financial information for programming and budgeting, by 
• 
institution of the cost building block and responsibility 
center concepts, realignment of the program elements to con-
form to organizational units, and other procedural changes . 
By themselves, the procedural changes of PRIME are quite 
effective and easy to implement . They must receive proper 
credit and praise as worthwhile improvements . But in going 
beyond these immediately-attainable changes and seeking to 
establish a wholly new management philosophy, PRIME has 
created many problems and aroused the strong opposition of 
the Congress. PRIME would place a heavy burden on operating 
managers and bind them with more constraints than now exist. 
Therefore it is di ff i cult to accept the premise of PRIME that 
it seeks to enhance the manager ' s ability to make decisions 
and to motivate him to make the "best" decisions . 
The basic problem which PRIME ignores is that Defense 
commanders are not equipped to exercise a great deal of dis-
cretion in resource allocation at the operating level . The 
majority of Defense commanders are not trained or experienced 
as managers of resources in a financial sense and are still, 
despite PRIME, bound by a great many nonmonetary constraints A 
on resources, in particular military personnel . PRIME does 
not match costs with the managers making the decisions con-
cerning the quality, quantity, or c ondit~ons of u~e of a 
great many military resources but instead focuses on the mere 
user of those resources. The military personnel allocation 
problem is one of the largest problems, along with the Con-
gress, which confronts PRIME . PRIME has seen fit to disregard 
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or discount this problem and the entire management control 
system of PRIME is thereby rendered futile . 
PRIME has promised to measure true costs, not "allo-
cated or prorated" costs . But the standard rates to be 
charged for military personnel services and maintenance of 
investment items are, in fact, only approximations of the 
true cost . PRIME has, therefore , compromised accuracy for 
expediency . The reliability and credibility of financial 
data applied to any given organizational unit is thereby 
lessened . In addition, fo~the reasons poin~ed- out in 
~bapter Y, PRIME can produce serious distortion to the true 
costs of maintenance for comparative purposes among aviation 
~· 
units . 
PRIME has aroused considerable interest in the improve-
ment of financial management in the military department . 
Operating managers are more aware than ever before of the 
benefits to be gained from the coupling of resources and 
operating management . Unfortunately, the overwhelming empha-
sis of PRIME to date has been on the costing of inputs . Out-
put measurement, a critical factor to the manager, has been 
relegated to last place in the order of development of PRIME . 
To date, no concrete working guidelines to aid the military 
departments in developing meaningful output measurements have 
been promulgated by OSD . What planning there is in OSD 
appears to be tailored to the needs of the Secretary of 
Defense, only . There has been no compelling sense of urgency 
regarding the importance of output measurement communicated 
7 
to the military departments, wherea.s the measurement of inputs 
has been the subject of intense , protracted deliberations at 
alllevels of the DOD. It is feared by the writer that PRIME 
will therefore engender a military management philosophy 
focused almost exclusively on the means to the end and the 
efficiency of the means . The ultimate test of Defense manage-
ment in today ' s troubled world will be effectiveness and 
effectiveness should be given at least parity with efficiency. 
PRIME has yet to give effectiveness the attention that it 
deserves . 
PRIME encompasses many changes which would be applied 
indiscriminately throughout the DOD without regard for 
existing systems--systems which could provide virtually the 
same financial information for planning, programming, and 
budgeting which PRIME seeks , at no extra cost . PRIME is not 
content to use or improve existing systems, however, but must 
instead create totally new systems within systems . The Con-
gress specifically prohibited implementation of PRIME in 
fiscal year 1968 and can be expected to continue to prohibit 
any change which might disrupt the way the Congress now enacts 
Defense appropriations . It would seem that OSD should take 
the interests of the Congress into account and reexamine PRIME 
in depth . The Congress called PRIME "too much too soon," and 
the label seems to fit . A more selective application of the 
concepts of PRIME, taking into account existing Defense manage-
ment systems and the wishes of the Congress, would yield far 
less costly and disruptive changes. 
• 
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To be effective, any management control system must 
be sponsored completely and sincerely by all levels of 
management . PRIME has already disturbed the Congress and 
no support is likely from that quarter . The enthusiasm for 
RMS/ PRIME was initia~ly high in the military departments . 
But, possessing the faults discussed in this study, PRIME 
cannot expect to gain full acceptance, especially at the 
operating level . And the operating managers are the very 
people that PRIME purports to aid . The writer believes that 
PRIME has been grossly oversold and will never achieve the 
lofty ideals expressed by its planners . Until PRIME backs 
down from its initial, zealous approach and adopts more 
realistic plans based on utilization of as much of existing 
systems and procedures as is possible and minimization of 
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